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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Department of Justice (DOJ) has entered multiple settlement 
agreements with financial institutions for their alleged misconduct in the 
2007-09 financial crisis. These agreements require civil monetary 
penalties in the form of payments to various agencies. They also contain 
provisions for consumer relief for some of the banks’ current customers. 
Some of the agreements also have allowed for donations to third-party, 
non-profit organizations.  
Commentators and legal academics have raised concerns with 
the DOJ’s settlement process1 and the third-party payments in recent 
congressional hearings investigating the settlements.2 Considering media 
reports about potential future settlements with large financial institutions, 
these concerns remain pertinent.3 
This article is the first academic research project to provide a 
detailed overview of 2012-16 multi-billion-dollar financial institution 
settlements, the major legal provisions involved, and the allocation of 
settlement funds to governments, states, agencies, victims, consumers, 
and other third parties. The settlements, which range from hundreds of 
millions to billions of dollars, relate to claims under the Financial 
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA),4 the 
False Claims Act,5 other federal laws, common law, and state laws.  
                                                          
1 See e.g., H.R. 5063, the “Stop Settlement Slush Funds Act of 2016”: Hearing 
on H.R. 5063 Before the Subcomm. on Reg. Reform, Commercial and Antitrust 
Law of the H. Comm on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 6-7 (2016) (statement of Mr. 
Goodlatte), available at https://perma.cc/73T4-D968; Settling the Question: Did 
Bank Settlement Agreements Subvert Congressional Appropriations Powers?: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. 
on Financial Services, 114th Cong. (2016). 
2 See, e.g., Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Funding Favored Sons and Daughters: 
Nonprosecution Agreements and “Extraordinary Restitution” in Environmental 
Criminal Cases, 47 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 1, 35-37 (2013); see also Paul J. 
Larkin, Jr., The Problematic Use of Nonprosecution and Deferred Prosecution 
Agreements to Benefit Third Parties, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Oct. 23, 
2014), https://perma.cc/QX9E-A8GX. 
3 Emily Glazer & Christina Rexrode, Justice Department Readies New Bank 
Settlements, WALL ST. J. (Jun. 4, 2015, 6:39 PM), available at 
https://perma.cc/9Q6V-UWG6; see also Arno Schuetze, Deutsche Bank to fight 
$14 billion demand from U.S. authorities, REUTERS (Sept. 16, 2016, 3:32 PM), 
available at https://perma.cc/M2LT-9E2M. 
4 12 U.S.C. § 1833(a) (2006). 
5 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2006). 
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Combined, the defendants, nine banks and one credit rating 
agency,6 agreed to pay a total of $72.43 billion, with $16.67 billion in 
penalties specifically under FIRREA, the largest amount under federal 
law, and $35.77 billion earmarked for consumer relief. By contrast, only 
$1.5 billion was allocated to direct cash payments for foreclosed 
borrowers directly harmed by the alleged conduct of the banks. 
Part II of this article provides background. Part III provides a 
brief overview of the settlement agreements and the payments required. 
Part IV discusses in depth the consumer relief provisions and criticisms 
of the settlements’ provisions. Part V considers three related issues: 
third-party payments in the United Kingdom, the use of settlement funds 
collected by the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (commonly 
referred to as the CFPB), and third party payment provisions in other 
DOJ settlements. Part VI discusses several constitutional, statutory, 
economic, and public policy criticisms of the recent settlements. Part VII 
looks at possible solutions and offers guidance to Congress in crafting a 
legislative solution. Part VIII concludes the article. 
This article will demonstrate that consumer relief provisions lack 
a connection to the underlying legal claims against the banks and seem 
intended to drop the hammer on financial institutions for perceived 
wrongs from the financial crisis, irrespective of their actual guilt and 
legal liability under specific laws allegedly violated. For constitutional 
and accountability reasons, settlements should not include provisions 
requiring, authorizing, or incentivizing corporate defendants to make 
payments to third parties. To prevent such settlement provisions, 
Congress should incorporate into existing agency statutes, FIRREA, the 
                                                          
6 Joint State-Federal National Servicing Settlements, NAT’L MORTG. 
SETTLEMENT (Mar. 12, 2012), https://perma.cc/BA76-GNGZ; JP Morgan Chase 
Settlement Agreement, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST. (Nov. 19, 2013), 
https://perma.cc/2DYN-83RQ; Citigroup Settlement Agreement, U.S. DEP’T. OF 
JUST. (Jul. 11, 2014), https://perma.cc/4QXL-RKTJ; Bank of America 
Settlement Agreement, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST. (Aug. 20, 2014), 
https://perma.cc/5DNZ-6SWH; Sun Trust Settlement Agreement, U.S. DEP’T. OF 
JUST. (Sept. 30, 2014), https://perma.cc/VUU6-6FVC; Standard & Poor’s 
Settlement Agreement, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST. (Feb. 2, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/AJ32-M6QT; Morgan Stanley Settlement Agreement, U.S. 
DEP’T. OF JUST. (Feb. 11, 2016), https://perma.cc/3238-GXW6; HSBC 
Settlement Agreement, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST. (Feb. 5, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/575W-C7WC; Wells Fargo Settlement Agreement, U.S. DEP’T. 
OF JUST. (Apr. 8, 2016), https://perma.cc/JK6K-9BQC; Goldman Sachs 
Settlement Agreement, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST. (Apr. 11, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/VWU4-XLWA. 
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False Claims Act, and other relevant statutes prohibitions on settlements 
containing third party payments.  
II.  BACKGROUND 
A. Factual Background on Mortgage Backed Securities 
Most of the bank settlements discussed in this article arise from 
allegedly fraudulent transactions relating to residential mortgage backed 
securities (RMBS).7 RMBS are securities that rely on cash flows from 
residential mortgage debt.8 Although there are many theories about what 
and who caused the financial crisis, many consider transactions involving 
RMBS, especially those that relied heavily on mortgages to subprime 
borrowers, to be at the heart of the financial crisis.9  
                                                          
7 According to the SEC, most Mortgage backed securities are issued by federal 
entities such as the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), a 
U.S. government agency, or the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie 
Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), U.S. 
government-sponsored enterprises. Private entities such as banks also issue 
RMBS and sell them to private investors and the government. See Mortgage-
Backed Securities, SEC (Jul. 23, 2010), https://perma.cc/Y4CY-BP9G. 
8 See Brent Radcliffe, Residential Mortgage-Backed Security (RMBS), 
INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 7, 2005), https://perma.cc/2EP9-P8UQ. The SEC explains: 
“Mortgage-backed securities… are debt obligations that represent claims to the 
cash flows from pools of mortgage loans, most commonly on residential 
property. Mortgage loans are purchased from banks, mortgage companies, and 
other originators and then assembled into pools by a governmental, quasi-
governmental, or private entity. The entity then issues securities that represent 
claims on the principal and interest payments made by borrowers on the loans in 
the pool, a process known as securitization.” See Mortgage-Backed Securities, 
supra note 7. 
9 See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT OF THE 
NATIONAL COMM’N ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS 
IN THE UNITED STATES, 1, 119-21 (2011) https://perma.cc/GB2T-FJVL. There 
is great debate over the role that the banks, investment firms, homebuyers, and 
the government played in causing the financial crisis. Some believe that the 
government incentivized RMBS and subprime mortgages. See Peter J. Wallison, 
Common Shock is the Real Cause of the Financial Crisis, ROLL CALL (Jan. 26, 
2012), https://perma.cc/26PT-R2LA; see also William D. Cohan, A Crusader 
Against the Common View of the Financial Crisis, NY TIMES (Mar. 11, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/6PQR-MLTW; see also PETER J. WALLISON, HIDDEN IN PLAIN 
SIGHT: WHAT REALLY CAUSED THE WORLD’S WORST FINANCIAL CRISIS AND 
WHY IT COULD HAPPEN AGAIN (Encounter Books) (2012) (discussing the 
5
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The DOJ formed a working group to investigate RMBS 
misconduct, specifically “potential false or misleading statements, 
deception or other misconduct by market participants in the creation, 
packaging and sale of mortgage-backed securities.”10 For example, in 
one settlement discussed in this article, the DOJ alleged that the bank 
“structured, offered, and sold over $850 million” in RMBS, including to 
federally-insured financial institutions, without disclosing that certain 
loans were experiencing decreased performance and underwriting 
issues.11  
In addition to RMBS transactions, many of the banks discussed 
in this article participate in the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development’s (HUD) Direct Endorsement Program. This program 
allows the banks to originate mortgages to first-time homebuyers, low-
income buyers, and refinancers with Federal Housing Administration 
(FHA) insurance.12 In turn, the banks are “obligated to determine 
whether prospective borrowers meet minimal credit-worthiness criteria 
and to certify to HUD that borrowers who received loans met the 
criteria”
13 because “the FHA guarantees payment of the outstanding 
portion of the mortgage principal, accrued interest, and costs owed by the 
borrower.”
14  
B. Corporate Incentives to Settle 
Settlement pressure on the financial institutions is intense. They 
may be willing to settle with the government to minimize the bad press 
associated with their role in the financial crisis. More generally, firms 
have incentives to settle government investigations, both in the criminal 
and civil context.15 Officers and directors negotiating on behalf of a 
                                                                                                                                  
government’s housing policy and the financial crisis). 
10 (RMBS) Working Group Announces New Resources to Investigate RMBS 
Misconduct, DEP’T. OF JUSTICE (May 24, 2012), https://perma.cc/6PXA-RKSL. 
11 U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, Bank of America Corp. Statement of Facts, 1 (2014), 
https://perma.cc/YQR9-95ZD. 
12 Id. at 17. 
13 Id. at 16-17. 
14 Id. 
15 For an extended discussion of the blurring of the distinction between criminal 
and civil liability, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: 
Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 
B.U. L. REV. 193, 221-46 (1991). 
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corporation also have significant incentives to settle cases.16 A negative 
public relations event relating to wrongdoing by a corporation can harm 
the stock price and the financial health of the company and a legal 
judgment can devastate the company.17 Corporations do not like to risk 
going to trial, so the government has greater leverage in settlement 
negotiations.18  
Corporations and managers eager for settlement are unlikely to 
object to settlement terms such as consumer relief or donations to third-
party organizations. To the contrary, these provisions may even be 
desirable from a public relations standpoint. These provisions may also 
be desirable if they reduce the amount the corporation must spend to 
resolve its legal claims. 
Banks are particularly unlikely to reject a settlement because of 
consumer relief provisions. It would be a difficult public relations task to 
explain to shareholders and the public why the bank chose to go to trial 
rather than agree to a settlement including reductions to mortgages or 
donations to third-party charities.  
An additional incentive to settle derives from banks’ ongoing 
regulatory relationship with the federal government. Accepting a 
settlement agreement may be perceived to be necessary for maintaining a 
good regulatory relationship. Both the factual background and the 
incentives that firms have to settle fall decisively in the government’s 
favor when procuring a settlement agreement.  
C. Definitions: Types of Payments 
The settlements in this article contain several different types of 
payments. These terms describing types of payments are usually similar 
in the civil and criminal context, but may carry different requirements or 
be calculated differently based on the underlying legal claim.  
                                                          
16 Richard Epstein, Deferred Prosecution Agreements on Trial: Lessons from the 
Law on Unconstitutional Conditions, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM: 
USING CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT 38, 41 (NYU Press 
ed., 2011). 
17 For example, Arthur Andersen surrendered its license after conviction. See 
News Roundup, Arthur Andersen Surrenders Its License to Practice Accounting 
in U.S., WALL ST. J. (Sept. 2, 2002, 8:39 PM), https://perma.cc/GYR2-CMPD; 
see also Gerald S. Martin, et. al., The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Economic 
Impact on Targeted Firms, SEARLE CIV. JUST. INST. 1, 14-19 (2014), 
https://perma.cc/H97R-RVEG. 
18 Epstein, supra note 16, at 56. 
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Criminal penalties can be determined by statute or by the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines. Congress empowers the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission to set the Guidelines, which federal judges must follow 
except in limited circumstances.19 Civil penalties are determined by 
statute; for example, a FIRREA penalty is a maximum of $1.1 million 
per violation or up to $5.5 million per violation if it is a continuing 
violation.  
Restitution restores money lost by an identifiable victim.20 
Remediation remedies an ongoing harm or prevents ongoing harm by the 
offender; for example, a product recall or an environmental clean-up 
order may be ordered as remediation of a defendant’s illegal conduct.21 
Disgorgement is the payment of any gain from an offense that is not paid 
back through restitution or remediation, and is often deposited in the US 
Treasury or returned to victims.22 Forfeiture usually involves the taking 
of property that was acquired or used in an offense.23 
Finally, consumer relief, the primary focus of this article, is not 
defined by statute, but is perhaps most analogous to criminal law’s 
community service. For purposes of this article, consumer relief can be 
thought of as a type of community service payment. According to the 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for individuals, community service can be 
imposed as a condition of probation and can be imposed in lieu of fines 
or penalties in certain circumstances.24 Specifically for corporations, 
community service can be imposed in criminal cases to repair the harm 
caused by the offense. The commentary to the Guidelines states: 
 
An organization can perform community service only by 
employing its resources or paying its employees or 
others to do so.  Consequently, an order that an 
organization perform community service is essentially 
an indirect monetary sanction, and therefore generally 
less desirable than a direct monetary sanction.  
However, where the convicted organization possesses 
knowledge, facilities, or skills that uniquely qualify it to 
repair damage caused by the offense, community service 
                                                          
19 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226 (2005).  
20 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUEL, § 8B1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2015). 
21 Id. at § 8B1.3 
22 Id. at § 8C2.9. 
23 Id. at § 5E1.4. 
24 Id. at § 5B1.3. 
8
Journal of Business & Securities Law, Vol. 17 [2017], Iss. 2, Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/jbsl/vol17/iss2/5
  
 
 
Issue 2  Evaluating Consumer Relief 261 
directed at repairing damage may provide an efficient 
means of remedying harm caused. 
 
In the past, some forms of community service imposed 
on organizations have not been related to the purposes of 
sentencing.  Requiring a defendant to endow a chair at a 
university or to contribute to a local charity would not 
be consistent with this section unless such community 
service provided a means for preventive or corrective 
action directly related to the offense and therefore served 
one of the purposes of sentencing set forth in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a).25 (emphasis added) 
 
As this article discusses, similar restraints might be appropriate 
for consumer relief in the civil context: a consumer relief provision is 
appropriate only when it would prevent or correct action directly related 
to the offense.  
III. THE 2012-2016 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS 
This article examines ten DOJ settlement agreements between 
2012 and 2016 involving financial institutions. The 2012 National 
Mortgage Servicing Settlement Agreement included five different banks: 
Ally/GMAC, Bank of America, Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase, and Wells 
Fargo. Between 2013 and 2016, the DOJ also settled individual 
agreements with JP Morgan Chase, Citigroup, Bank of America, 
SunTrust, Standard and Poor’s, HSBC, Morgan Stanley, Wells Fargo, 
and Goldman Sachs. Each agreement is listed in the table below. 
Total amounts include all payments, fines, penalties, and 
donations required as part of the agreement. The total federal amount 
includes payments to federal agencies and penalties under federal laws 
such as FIRREA and the False Claims Act. In some cases, the firm did 
not pay any penalty under FIRREA or the False Claims Act, but the 
government still released the firm from liability under those laws. In 
several of these agreements, the government only released the firm from 
specific liabilities under these laws. 
 
Table 1 on page 263 also tallies how much, if any, consumer 
relief the agreement requires. The table also records payments of direct 
                                                          
25 Id. at § 8B1. 
9
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restitution to foreclosed borrowers and donations to non-profit 
organizations.
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Table 1: DOJ-Involved Settlement Agreements 
* Includes claims by FHA, qui tam actions 
* Agencies include: SEC, FDIC, NCUA, as well as Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae 
* Numbers rounded to nearest million/billion, actual figure in accompanying footnote 
Bank Name Settle Date 
Total 
Amount 
Total Fed. 
Amt. 
FIRREA 
Penalty 
False 
Claims 
Act 
State-
Based 
Payments 
Fed. 
Agency 
Payments* 
Consum. 
Relief 
Direct 
Restitution 
Non-
Profit 
Cash 
Nat’l 
Mortg. 4/4/12 ~$24 bil.
1 $911 mil.2 Released $911 mil.3 $2.6 bil.4 $0 $19.1 bil.5 $1.5 bil.6 No 
JP 
Morgan 
Chase 
11/19/13 $13 bil. ~$7.9 bil.7 $2 bil. Released $1.07 bil.8 $5.9 bil.9 $4 bil. $0 No 
Citigrp. 7/14/14 $7 bil. $4.2 bil.10 $4 bil. Released $2.91 mil.11 $2.08 mil.
12 $2.5 mil. $0 Yes 
Bank of 
America 
8/21/14 $16.65 mil. $8.2 bil.13 
$5 
billion 
$1.85 bil. $9.43 mil.  $1.4 bil.14 $7.5 bil.15 $0 Yes 
SunTrust 9/30/14 ~$928 mil.16 $428 mil.17 Released Released $0 $0 $500 mil. $40  
mil. 
No 
Standard 
& Poors 2/3/15 $1.375 mil. 
~$6.9 
mil.18 
~$6.9 
mil.19 Released 
~$6.9 
mil.20 
Not 
Released $0.00 $0 No 
HSBC 2/5/16 $4.698 mil. $40.5 mil. Released Released $59.3 mil. $0.00 $370 mil. $0 No 
Morgan 
Stanley 2/11/16 $2.6 bil. $2.6 bil. $2.6 bil. 
Some 
Release $0 
Not 
Released $0.00 $0 No 
Wells 
Fargo 4/8/16 $1.2 bil. $0 Released 
Some 
Release $0 Released $0.00 $0 No 
Goldman 
Sachs 
4/11/16 $5.06 bil. $2.96 bil. ~$2.4 
bil.21 
Released $300 mil. $575 mil. $1.8 bil. $0 No 
Total ~$72 bil.22 ~$28 
bil.23 
~16.7 
bil.24 
~2.8 bil.25 ~$5.9 
bil.26 
~$8.1 
bil.27 
~$35.8 
bil.28 
$1.5 
bil.29 
                                                          
1 $24,144,107,454.00 
2 $911,777,917.00 
3 $911,777,917.00 
4 $2,649,092,379.00 
5 $19,112,600,000.00 
6 $1,470,637,158.00 
7 $7,932,989,690.73 
8 $1,067,010,309.00 
9 $5,932,989,690.73 
10 $4,208,250,000.00 
11 $291,750,000.00 
12 $208,250,000.00 
13 $8,236,840,000.00 
14 $1,386,840,000.00 
15 $7,490,160,000.00 
16 $928,271,986.00 
17 $428,271,986.00 
18 $687,500,000.00 
19 $687,500,000.00 
20 $687,500,000.00 
21 $2,385,000,000.00 
22 $72,427,179,440.00 
23 $28,006,129,593.73 
24 $16,672,500,000.00 
25 $2,761,777,917.00 
26 $5,997,652,688.00 
27 $8,103,079,690.73 
11
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As the table shows, the DOJ settled with these firms for a total of 
$72.4 million. Of that amount, $35.8 million was directed toward 
consumer relief, while only $28 million was specifically directed toward 
federal payments for violations of statutes or to resolve agency claims. 
Furthermore, only $1.5 billion was required as direct restitution to 
foreclosed borrowers, or victims of the financial institution’s alleged 
illegal conduct. Finally, of the seven agreements that required consumer 
relief, only two required donations to non-profit organizations. 
IV. THE CONSUMER RELIEF PROVISIONS 
A. The Consumer Relief Provisions in Detail 
i. Consumer Mortgage Modifications 
The seven agreements that contain consumer relief provisions 
allow for modification, reduction, or forgiveness of a first lien mortgage. 
For example, the Bank of America settlement allows $1 credit for $1 
principal forgiveness on a first lien, but only if Bank of America 
provides at least a minimum of $2.5 billion for this type of forgiveness.30 
Different types of first-lien forgiveness garner different amounts of 
credit, depending on, for example, the loan-to-value ratio, the interest 
rates, the type of loan, and whether the loan is in a “hardest hit area.” To 
qualify for any credit, at least 50 percent of the modifications must be in 
these areas.31  
The Bank of America settlement also credits modifications 
relating to second liens and junior liens. The settlement allows a 
maximum of $2.5 billion in credit for principal forgiveness on second 
liens and $3 billion for the combination of principal forgiveness on 
second liens, junior liens, and forgiveness of principal for properties on 
which foreclosure is not pursued.32 Unlike the Bank of America 
settlement, the Citigroup settlement allows credit for reducing the rate of 
or refinancing a mortgage.33 Finally, both agreements allow the bank to 
                                                                                                                                  
28 $35,772,760,000.00 
29 $1,510,637,158.00 
30 Consumer Relief Bank of Am. Settlement Agreement, DEP’T. OF JUSTICE 1, 2 
https://perma.cc/8Z2B-2KX2 (last visited Mar. 13, 2017). 
31 Id. at 3. 
32 Id. at 5-6. 
33 Consumer Relief Citigroup Settlement Agreement, DEP’T. OF JUSTICE 1, 6 
12
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forgive the principal on a mortgage where foreclosure is not pursued and 
liens are released. In other words, the bank receives credit for walking 
away from properties that may be worthless anyway.34 
Table 2 below shows the division of credited consumer mortgage 
modification relief for both the Bank of America and Citigroup 
settlements. Citigroup has directed most of its relief in this category to 
rate reductions/refinancing and the walk away properties. Bank of 
America has directed most of its relief to first lien principal forgiveness 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                  
https://perma.cc/YCY9-HBXQ. (last visited Mar. 13, 2017) 
34 See Allan Mallach, Now You See the Money, Now You Don’t, ROOFLINES 
(Sept. 22, 2014), https://perma.cc/YZV3-YNU7. 
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Table 2: Consumer Mortgage Modifications in Bank of America & 
Citigroup Settlements 
 Bank of 
America 
Citigroup 
First Lien Principal Forgiveness $3028890653 $17096960 
Principal Forgiveness of 
Forbearance 
$565181334 $0 
First Lien Forbearance (Payment 
Forgiveness) 
$162543379 $0 
Second Lien Principal Forgiveness 
and Extinguishment 
$0 $0 
First Lien Balance Forgiveness Not Permitted $0 
Second Lien Balance Forgiveness Not Permitted $0 
Assistance for Borrowers 
Refinancing Outside of Bank 
Not Permitted $0 
Junior Liens Unsecured Principal 
Forgiveness/Extinguishment 
$1517824086 $0 
Rate Reductions or Refinancing Not Permitted $306008576 
Principal Forgiveness where 
foreclosure is not pursued and liens 
are released 
$0 $459665037 
 $5274439452 $782770573 
ii. Low-Income Lending and Affordable 
Housing Rental Projects 
The Bank of America settlement also allows the bank to earn 
credits for low-to-moderate income lending: a $10,000 credit for 
purchase money loans to eligible borrowers in a “hardest hit” area, who 
lost a home due to foreclosure or short sale, or are first time 
borrowers/private mortgage insurance borrowers.35 This provision has no 
minimum or maximum.36 Citigroup also has the same provision for low-
income lending. 
The Bank of America settlement also provides $3.75 worth of 
credit for every $1 Bank of America loses investing in affordable rental 
                                                          
35 Bank of America Consumer Relief, supra note 30, at 6-7. 
36 Id. 
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housing.37 At least half of the financing must be for Critical Need Family 
Housing, which is defined as “affordable low-income rental housing 
developments selected by Bank of America” that are located in “Difficult 
Development Areas” defined by HUD or state defined “High 
Opportunity/Low Poverty Areas.”38 To qualify for any credits, Bank of 
America must lose at least $100 million in financing these 
developments,39 while Citigroup, which is also eligible for this type of 
credit, must lose at least $180 million.40 
iii. Donations to Non-Profit Organizations and 
Community Development/Revitalization 
Bank of America also can obtain credit for community 
reinvestment and neighborhood stabilization, for example: credit for 
costs paid for demolition or remediation of abandoned or uninhabitable 
property; donations of mortgages or bank owned properties to cities; and 
contributions to land banks, non-profits, or service-members with 
disabilities.41 The bank receives $1 in credit for every dollar paid or 
contributed. 
Bank of America is also eligible for $2 credit for every $1 
donated to non-profits to facilitate reduction, rehabilitation, or 
maintenance of abandoned or uninhabitable residential properties. Bank 
of America must make at least $50 million in donations to “capitalize 
certified Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs), land 
banks subject to state or local regulation, or community development 
funds administered by non-profits or local governments.”42 According to 
the Department of Treasury, the CDFI fund organizations are “mission-
driven financial institutions that take a market-based approach to 
supporting economically disadvantaged communities” by providing 
“access to financial products and services.”43 Citigroup, which is also 
                                                          
37 Id. at 8. Loss is “measured as the difference between the fair value and par 
value, as reflected on the books and records of Bank of America, on the 
origination date of the subordinated loan made to facilitate the construction, 
rehabilitation, or preservation of affordable low-income rental housing.” Id. at 8 
n.24. 
38 Id. at 8 n.23. 
39 Id. at 8. 
40 Citigroup Settlement Consumer Relief, supra note 33, at 6. 
41 Bank of America Consumer Relief, supra note 30, at 11. 
42 Id. 
43 Cmty. Dev. Fin. Inst. Fund, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
https://perma.cc/D5Q4-BKP3 (last visited Apr. 10, 2017). 
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eligible for this type of credit, must make $25 million in donations to 
qualify for credit under its parallel provision.44 
Both settlements allow credit for donations to Interest on Lawyer 
Trust Account (IOLTA) and similar legal-aid charities. The Bank of 
America settlement requires at least $30 million in donations (and 
affords $2 credit for every $1 donated) to IOLTA organizations or state 
bar associations that provide funds to legal aid organizations “to be used 
for foreclosure prevention legal assistance and community 
redevelopment legal assistance.”45 Citigroup must make at least $15 
million in donations under its IOLTA requirement.46  
The Bank of America and Citigroup settlements offer credit for 
donations to HUD-approved counseling agencies. Organizations must 
meet several criteria to become HUD-approved.47 Services provided by 
HUD-approved housing counseling agencies include pre-purchase 
counseling, predatory lending education workshops, default resolution 
counseling, and fair housing pre-purchase education workshops.48 There 
are approximately 2,700 HUD-approved housing counseling agencies 
across the United States.49 Many of these have very broad missions that 
include activities wholly unrelated to housing counseling.50 Accordingly, 
some have questioned whether the DOJ should be requiring banks to 
make donations to these agencies.51 The Bank of America settlement 
requires at least $20 million in donations (and gives $2 credit for every 
                                                          
44 Id. 
45 Bank of America Consumer Relief, supra note 30, at 7. 
46 Citigroup Consumer Relief, supra note 33, at 12. 
47 For all of the criteria, see Fed. Hous. Comm’r, Application for Approval as a 
Housing Counseling Agency, HUD, https://perma.cc/MMY7-2VBH. A few of 
the important criteria include: non-profit status as a 501(c) organization; 
experience of at least a year administering a housing counseling program; at 
least a year functioning in the geographic area; and sufficient resources to 
implement its counseling plan. See HUD, Agencies Listed in Washington D.C., 
HUD.GOV, https://perma.cc/X4CQ-TG8T. 
48 Id. 
49 In the District of Columbia, for example, there are nineteen HUD-approved 
housing counseling agencies. Id. In Virginia, there are fifty-one organizations 
receiving HUD-approval. See HUD, Agencies Listed in Virginia, HUD.GOV, 
https://perma.cc/HAE2-8MVM. 
50 See Monitor of the 2014 Bank of Am. Mortg. Settlement, Settlement Monitor 
Report (2016), https://perma.cc/L27M-MQJ9, for a complete list of 
organizations receiving donations as part of the consumer relief provisions in 
that settlement. 
51 See Cong. Hearings, supra note 1, at 10-11. 
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$1 donated) to HUD-approved housing counseling agencies to “provide 
foreclosure prevention assistance and other housing counseling 
activities.”
52 Citigroup’s settlement requires at least $10 million to be 
donated to HUD-approved housing counseling agencies and also offers 
$2 credit for every $1 donated.53 
iii. Distribution of Bank of America and 
Citigroup Consumer Relief by Category 
As Table 3 below shows, the total amount of consumer relief 
credited to both Citigroup and Bank of America as of their June and 
August 2016 reports, respectively, is $7.268 billion. Of that amount, 
$6.057 billion was directed toward consumer mortgage modifications 
such as loan forgiveness, forbearance, and rate reductions. $788 million 
was directed to low-income lending and affordable housing, while $423 
million in credit is for donations made to non-profit organizations, such 
as legal services organizations, HUD-approved housing counseling 
agencies, and other community development organizations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
52 Bank of America Consumer Relief, supra note 30, at 7. 
53 Citigroup Consumer Relief, supra note 33, at 12. 
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Table 3: Consumer Relief Credit 
Consumer Relief Type 
Bank of 
America 
Credit (Aug. 
2016) 
Citigroup 
Credit 
(Jun. 2016) 
Total Credit 
Consumer Mortg. 
Modifications (Forgiveness, 
Forbearance, Rate Reduction) 
$5,274,439,452  $782,770,573  $6,057,210,025  
Low to Moderate Income 
Lending 
$346,201,500  $0  $346,201,500  
Donations of Mortgages and 
Property to Non-Profits 
$68,703,427  $0  $68,703,427  
Donations for 
Rehabilitation/Maintenance 
of Donated Property 
$14,094,058  Not 
Mandated 
$14,094,058  
Donations to Community 
Development Organizations 
$110,283,564  $57,500,000  $167,783,564  
Donations to Housing 
Counseling Organizations 
$46,000,000  $23,000,000  $69,000,000  
Donations to Legal Services 
Org. 
$69,000,000  $34,500,000  $103,500,000  
Donations to Affordable 
Rental Hous. Projects 
$441,865,938  $0  $441,865,938  
Total Credit for Relief to 
Existing Mortg. Customers 
$5,274,439,452  $782,770,573  $6,057,210,025  
Total Credit for Non-Profit 
Org. Donations/Cmty. Inv. 
$308,081,049  $115,000,000  $423,081,049  
Total Credit for Low-Income 
Lending & Affordable Rental 
Hous. 
$788,067,438  $0  $788,067,438  
Total Credit $6,370,587,939  $897,770,573  $7,268,358,512  
B. Donations Made to Non-Profit Organizations Under 
the Consumer Relief Provisions 
The Bank of America Settlement Monitor’s54 August 2016 
Report shows detail of which groups have received funding as of June 
2016.55 For donations to community development funds, Bank of 
                                                          
54 The settlement creates an independent monitor appointed by the defendant and 
DOJ to oversee the settlement’s provisions. See, e.g., Bank of America 
Settlement, supra note 6, at 8 (“An independent monitor will determine whether 
Bank of America has satisfied the obligations contained in Annex 2 (such 
monitor to be Eric Green).”). 
55 Bank of America, supra note 50, at 106-19. 
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America received over $110 million in credit.56 For donations to IOLTA 
groups and bar associations, Bank of America received $69 million in 
credit. For donations to HUD-approved housing counseling agencies, 
Bank of America received $46 million for affordable rental housing 
projects; Bank of America received over $441 million in credit. 
The June 2016 Citigroup monitor report details payments made 
to third party non-profit organizations.57 Citigroup has received $23 
million in credit for donations made to housing counseling agencies, 
$34.5 million in credit for donations to legal aid organizations, and $57.5 
million in credit for donations to community development organizations, 
for a total of $115 million in credit, with an actual total donation amount 
of $50 million, demonstrating the extra credit given for these donations. 
Once a donation is made to a third-party organization, banks are 
under no obligation to ensure that the organization spends it in any 
particular way. The DOJ also retains no control over the payment once it 
has been made. The only limitation on the nexus between the payment 
and the violation appears to come from informal DOJ guidance about the 
original settlement agreement.58 Nor can DOJ control what these third-
party organizations do. In fact, to claim compliance with federal law, the 
DOJ cannot have control over the payment once the settlement 
agreement has been signed.59  
                                                          
56 Id. 
57 See Citigroup Settlement Monitor Report, CITIGROUP MONITORSHIP (2016), 
https://perma.cc/XTB4-XBEW. 
58 See Settling the Question: Did Bank Settlement Agreements Subvert 
Congressional Appropriations Powers?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Fin. Serv., 114th Cong. 6 
(2016) (written statement of David K. Min), https://perma.cc/U352-6BGL 
(citing Kris Dighe, Organizational Community Service in Environmental Crimes 
Cases, in UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S BULLETIN 101, 105 (July 2012)). 
 
When negotiating the resolution of a case or requesting that a 
sentence include a requirement that a defendant perform 
community service, including the commitment of funds, 
prosecutors should ensure that a nexus to the violation is 
present. In other words, a relationship between the violation and 
the proposed activity should be established. 
Id. 
59See Deputy Assist’t Att’y Gen’l C. Kevin Marshall, Off. of Legal Couns., Dep 
T of Justice, Application of the Governmentt Corporation Control Act and the 
Miscellaneous Receipts Act to the Canadian Softwood Lumber Settlement 
Agreement, Memo. Opinion for the Gen’l Counsel U.S. Trade Rep. 8 (Aug. 22, 
2006).  
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Table 4 below shows which non-profit organizations have 
received donations in excess of $2 million by category. Bank of America 
has donated a significant amount to a wide variety of organizations under 
different categories. Citigroup, which settled for only $2.5 billion 
compared to Bank of America’s $7.49 billion settlement, has mostly 
confined its largest donations to community development and legal 
services organizations. 
 
Table 4: Non-Profits Receiving Donations Over $2 Million Total As 
of June 2016 (Citigroup) and August 2016 (BoA) 
* Organizations may have received donations in other categories or through 
local subsidiaries. This total amount is based on the total amount of donations 
under the specific category. Additionally, Bank of America’s report lumps 
community development and housing counseling agencies together while 
Citigroup’s separates these categories. 
 Non-Profit 
Organization Name* 
Amt. 
Credited 
Type of Donations 
Bank of  
America 
Housing Partnership 
Fund, Inc. 
$45,479,061  Cmty. Dev. and 
Hous. Counseling 
 National Community 
Stabilization Trust 
$45,155,885  Mortgages/Properties 
 Community Restoration 
Corp. 
$13,932,874  Rehabilitation/Mai
ntenance 
 Local Initiatives Support 
Corporation 
$9,877,002  Cmty. Dev. and 
Hous. Counseling 
 Enterprise Community 
Loan Fund 
$8,625,000  Cmty. Dev. and 
Hous. Counseling 
 Legal Services Trust 
Fund Corp. (CA IOLTA) 
$5,715,954  Rehabilitation/Mai
ntenance 
 USA Homeownership 
Foundation 
$4,863,235  Mortgages/Properties 
 Community Preservation 
Corp. 
$4,600,000  Cmty. Dev. and 
Hous. Counseling 
 Texas Equal Access to 
Justice Foundation 
$4,514,962  Legal Services 
 Neighborworks America $3,795,000  Cmty. Dev. and 
Hous. Counseling 
 The Reinvestment Fund $3,680,000  Cmty. Dev. and 
Hous. Counseling 
 National Council of La 
Raza 
$3,450,000  Cmty. Dev. and 
Hous. Counseling 
 Habitat for Humanity $3,450,000  Cmty. Dev. and 
Hous. Counseling 
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 Military Warriors 
Support Foundation 
$3,373,525  Mortgages/Properties 
 Florida Bar Foundation $3,210,110  Legal Services 
 IOLA Fund of the State 
of New York 
$3,094,392  Legal Services 
 National Urban League $2,645,000  Cmty. Dev. and 
Hous. Counseling 
 National Community 
Reinvestment Coalition 
$2,600,000  Cmty. Dev. and 
Hous. Counseling 
 Carrington Charitable 
Found. 
$2,459,160  Mortgages/Properties 
 Chicago Community 
Loan Fund 
$2,300,000  Cmty. Dev. and 
Hous. Counseling 
 Ohio Legal Assistance 
Foundation 
$2,105,826  Legal Services 
 Lawyers Trust Fund of 
Illinois 
$2,079,806  Legal Services 
 Detroit Land Bank Auth. $2,040,000  Cmty. Dev. and 
Hous. Counseling 
 Georgia Bar Foundation $2,021,000  Legal Services 
 Opportunity Resource 
Fund 
$2,020,000  Cmty. Dev. and 
Hous. Counseling 
 Fondo Acceso a la 
Justicia, Inc. (Puerto 
Rico) 
$2,003,215  Legal Services 
 Citigroup    
 Legal Services Trust 
Fund Program State Bar 
of California 
$8,280,000  Legal Services 
 Interest on Lawyer 
Account Fund of the 
State of New York 
$7,728,000  Legal Services 
 Enterprise Community 
Loan Fund, Inc. 
$5,290,000  Cmty. Dev. 
 Local Initiatives Support 
Corp. 
$5,290,000  Cmty. Dev. 
 Community Hous. 
Works Realty & Lending 
$4,600,000  Cmty. Dev. 
 Neighborhood Lending 
Services, Inc. 
$3,680,000  Cmty. Dev. 
 Detroit Land Bank Auth. $3,450,000  Cmty. Dev. 
 Lawyers Trust Fund of 
Illinois 
$3,450,000  Legal Services 
 Massachusetts IOLTA 
Committee 
$3,450,000  Legal Services 
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 National Community 
Reinvestment Coalition 
$3,450,000  Cmty. Dev. 
 Neighborhood Hous. 
Services of South Florida 
$3,450,000  Cmty. Dev. 
 Neighborhood 
Stabilization Corp. 
$3,450,000  Hous. 
Counseling 
 The Housing Partnership 
Fund, Inc. 
$3,450,000  Cmty. Dev. 
 Aura Mortgage Advisors 
LLC 
$2,990,000  Cmty. Dev. 
 Community Loan Fund 
of New Jersey 
$2,990,000  Cmty. Dev. 
 Cuyahoga County Land 
Reutilization Corp. 
$2,760,000  Cmty. Dev. 
 Cook County Land Bank 
Auth. 
$2,300,000  Cmty. Dev. 
 Long Island Hous. 
Partnership CDFI 
$2,300,000  Cmty. Dev. 
 Low Income Investment 
Fund 
$2,300,000  Cmty. Dev. 
 Neighborhood 
Partnership Housing 
Services, Inc. 
$2,300,000  Cmty. Dev. 
 Northern California 
Community Loan Fund 
$2,300,000  Cmty. Dev. 
 Sacramento 
Neighborhood Housing 
Services Inc. 
$2,300,000  Cmty. Dev. 
 Maryland Legal Services 
Corporation 
$2,300,000  Legal Services 
 The District of Columbia 
Bar Foundation 
$2,300,000  Legal Services 
C. Which Consumers Can Actually Receive Direct 
Consumer Relief? 
Generally, three groups of consumers are eligible for relief under 
the recent settlements: (1) those actually harmed by the alleged 
misconduct; (2) those who have suffered harm from conduct similar to 
the bank’s alleged misconduct; and (3) those who have suffered harm in 
general, but not necessarily as a result of misconduct by the defendant 
bank or any other bank, for example, those who may be unemployed and 
unable to make mortgage payments.  
The payment of restitution from the settling financial institution 
is only appropriate for those actually harmed by the bank’s alleged 
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misconduct, the first group. Only in two DOJ settlements, National 
Mortgage Servicing60 and SunTrust,61 and one CFPB settlement, 
Ocwen,62 is relief directed to identified victims, borrowers foreclosed as 
a result of the alleged misconduct of those banks. Unlike the consumer 
relief provisions described above, this direct restitution is aimed at 
people who are entitled to relief. The banks have no choice as to whether 
they can provide relief to them, as they do with the consumer relief 
provisions.  
It is unclear, and left open to interpretation, whether the 
consumer relief provisions are intended to be restitution, remediation, or 
some other form of relief. What is clear is that the banks get to choose 
which consumers receive relief, what type, how much, and when. No 
consumer is entitled to relief. Much of the consumer relief is not directed 
to identifiable victims.  
As seen in the second and third groups, the bank settlement 
beneficiaries are not limited to clearly identifiable victims of bank 
misconduct. For example, consumers who have bought a home and fallen 
into default well after the financial crisis are, in some cases, eligible for 
relief. Also eligible are consumers who are unemployed, a condition that 
may be entirely unrelated to the financial crisis, let alone the settling 
banks’ conduct. The settlements afford the banks considerable latitude to 
choose who receives this non-victim compensation. Because the settling 
bank decides which consumers to compensate, there is no way to verify 
that the selected consumers were actually ever harmed by the bank’s 
conduct.  
Allegedly remedial actions—such as mortgage modifications—
that the banks might have undertaken anyway for their own business 
reasons perhaps should not count at all toward a settlement.63 If the 
government claims that consumer relief is intended to remediate harms 
caused by the bank, it should explain how each specific relief menu item 
and consumer targeted is directly connected to the conduct or would 
prevent future harm of the specific type alleged. 
                                                          
60 Bank of America Settlement Agreement, supra note 6, at 8-9. 
61 Sun Trust Settlement Agreement, supra note 6, at 4-5. 
62 See Ocwen Nat’l Serv., Nat’l Ocwen National Serv. Settlement, NATIONAL 
OCWEN (Feb. 22, 2014), https://perma.cc/2A5N-ETWR. 
63 See Jacob Davidson, Bank of America Is Paying Up for the Mortgage Mess, 
But Who Will Get the Money? TIME (Aug. 29, 2014), https://perma.cc/W87K-
UUTP; see also Alan Pyke, The Truth Of The Goldman Sachs Settlement Is In 
The Fine Print, THINK PROGRESS (Apr. 11, 2016), https://perma.cc/4UZL-
B9FA. 
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D. Recent Developments and Criticism of the 
Consumer Relief Provisions 
The Bank of America and Citigroup settlements have inspired 
numerous objections. Some commentators objected to giving credit to 
the banks for donating to non-profits because the settlement is unfair to 
the banks, consumers, and opposite to the interests of justice.64 Others 
have raised cronyism concerns regarding the government’s favorable 
treatment of certain banks.65 Others worry that these settlements will set 
a precedent for future regulators and government officials.66  Critics also 
have faulted these settlements as Executive Branch incursions on the 
appropriations power of Congress.67 Critics have also argued that the 
consumer relief provisions incentivize charitable activities that the banks 
would have engaged in anyway and that these donations may pale in 
comparison to the damage caused by the banks’ alleged misconduct.68 
Some have also raised concerns about government transparency 
and accountability. For example, one organization claims that the DOJ 
has not cited legal authority for diverting settlement money from bank 
settlements to third party organizations Other interested groups,69 think 
tank analysts,70 and commentators71 have sought documents related to the 
                                                          
64 Inv. Bus. Daily, CFPB Joins Justice In Shaking Down Banks For Democrat 
Activist Groups, INV. BUS. DAILY ED. (Jun. 17, 2015), https://perma.cc/QK3K-
ENH2. 
65 Inv. Bus. Daily, Holder Cut Left-Wing Groups In On $17 Bil BofA Deal, INV. 
BUS. DAILY ED. (Aug. 27, 2014), https://perma.cc/FW3B-69HS. 
66 H.R. 5063, the “Stop Settlement Slush Funds Act of 2016”: Hearing on H.R. 
5063 Before the Subcomm. on Reg. Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law of 
the H. Comm on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 4-5 (2016) (statement of Paul F. 
Figley). 
67 Settling the Question: Did the Bank Settlement Agreements Subvert 
Congressional Appropriations Power? Before the H. Comm. On Fin. Servs., 
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations (2016) (Statement of Paul J. Larkin, 
Jr., Senior Res. Fellow, Heritage Found), https://perma.cc/XS4R-WF9H. 
68 Davidson, supra note 63. 
69 Dan Epstein, Obama DOJ Channels Bank Shakedown Money to Private 
Groups, INV. BUS. DAILY (July 7, 2015), https://perma.cc/FC6X-UA5Z. 
70 See, e.g., FOIA to Department of Justice, CAUSE OF ACTION (Jun. 16, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/V9NG-ZWGM; see also DOJ to Give Leftist Groups Cut of B of 
A Settlement, JUD. WATCH  (Aug. 28, 2014), https://perma.cc/X54A-MM74. 
71 Consumers Shortchanged? Oversight of the Justice Dep’t’s Mortg. Lending 
Settlements before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Regulatory 
Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law (2015) (Written testimony of Paul J. 
Larkin, Jr., Senior Res. Fellow, Heritage Found), https://perma.cc/XK8D-
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settlements and have questioned the legality and motivation of these 
settlements.72 According to Judicial Watch, the DOJ stated in a 2011 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request that it had no guidelines 
regarding the monitoring or qualification of third party organizations 
eligible for settlement funds.73  
Congressional oversight committee hearings also reflect 
concerns about the recent settlements and third party payments. The 
House Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform, 
Commercial, and Antitrust Law held a hearing in February 2015,74 and 
Judiciary Committee Chairman Bob Goodlatte offered an amendment to 
the DOJ appropriations bill that would prohibit the DOJ from requiring 
payments to third parties in settlement agreements.75 Goodlatte later 
introduced a bill that would extend the prohibition to all government 
agents and impose penalties for violating the prohibition.76 Also 
introduced in 2016, the Agency Accountability Act, would require that 
fees, fines, penalties, and proceeds from a settlement be deposited in 
Treasury’s general fund.77 The House Judiciary Committee’s 
Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform, Commercial, and Antitrust Law78 
held a hearing in 2016, and the House Financial Services Committee’s 
Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee also has looked into the 
issue.79  
                                                                                                                                  
XV7W. 
72 Kimberley A. Strassel, Justice’s Liberal Slush Fund, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 3, 
2015, 7:17 PM), https://perma.cc/H27S-DKCE. 
73 Nelson D. Hermilla, Letter in Response to Freedom of Information Act 
Request by Judicial Watch, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. CIV/ RIGHTS DIV. (Apr. 14, 
2011), https://perma.cc/KHT7-X8DV. 
74 See Consumers Shortchanged? Oversight of the Justice Dep’t. Mortg. Lending 
Settlements, Hearing before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on 
Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law (2015) 
https://perma.cc/J39Z-W52D. 
75 REP. GOODLATTE, H. Amendment 318 to H.R. 2578 (2015), 
https://perma.cc/68WY-B6JH. 
76 Stop Settlement Slush Funds Act of 2016, H.R. 5063, 114th Cong. (2016), 
available at https://perma.cc/TC8C-CA7Q. 
77 Agency Accountability Act of 2016, H.R. 5499, 114th Cong. (2016), 
available at https://perma.cc/9XQB-BYEW. 
78 See Bob Goodlatte, Chair of H.R. Jud. Comm., Stop Settlement Slush Funds 
Act of 2016: Hearing on H.R. 5063 Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, 
Commercial and Antitrust Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 
(2016), https://perma.cc/DQB4-MCXT. 
79 See Fin. Serv. Comm., Settling the Question: Did Bank Settlement Agreements 
Subvert Congressional Appropriations Powers?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
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V. OTHER EXAMPLES OF SETTLEMENT FUNDS DIVERTED TO 
THIRD PARTIES 
The DOJ is not alone in using settlement as opportunities to 
direct funds to third-parties who were not harmed by the settling 
company. This section discusses several examples. 
A.  United Kingdom’s LIBOR Penalties 
The practice of diverting settlement funds to third parties is not 
limited to the United States. The United Kingdom’s (UK) Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA) has levied over 1.1 billion pounds in fines 
related to the alleged manipulation of the London Interbank Offered Rate 
(LIBOR), and Former Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne has 
used some of this money to fund popular causes of his choosing.80 In 
total, UK charities, including especially military-related charities, have 
                                                                                                                                  
on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 114th 
Cong. (2016), https://perma.cc/6CPQ-WURU. 
80 See Sean Farrell, FCA's £819m in fines revenue gives Osborne room to fund 
worthy causes, THE GUARDIAN (Jul. 5, 2015, 12:50 PM), 
https://perma.cc/DLS3-MSVX; see also George Osborne, Chancellor, Autumn 
Statement 2014 speech, Oral statement to Parliament (Dec. 2, 2014) (transcript 
available at https://perma.cc/NU8G-5GKQ).  
As the Wall Street Journal reported, a million dollars had been 
distributed to a charity group, Agincourt 600, which planned a 600-year 
commemoration of the Battle of Agincourt. Due to the influx of money, the 
group changed a modest celebration into an extravaganza and still could not 
figure out how to spend all of the money. More money was given to other 
organizations, such as therapeutic bakers, resurfaced tennis courts at a treatment 
center for injured police, and a camping and crafts organization known to be 
“hippie Scouts.” See Margot Patrick, England’s Bank Fines Are a Boon for a 
Happy Few, WALL ST. J. (May 30, 2015, 12:04 AM), https://perma.cc/EA65-
4WT4.  
Additionally, then Prime Minister Cameron pledged to send money 
from Deutsche Bank’s settlement to set up 50,000 in “apprenticeships” for 
young adults. See Reuters Editorial, PM says Deutsche Bank's Libor fine to be 
used for apprenticeships – Guardian, REUTERS (Apr. 28, 2015, 12:57 AM), 
https://perma.cc/V49T-FG24. 
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received over 400 million pounds.81 The chancellor’s allocations are 
subject to parliamentary approval during the annual budgeting process.82  
B.  The CFPB’s Civil Penalty Fund, CFPB 
Settlements, and Other Agency Penalty Funds 
Domestically, the DOJ is not alone in its practice of adding third-
parties to the list of settlement beneficiaries. Several federal agencies 
have statutory authority to maintain civil monetary penalties in funds that 
they may distribute to third parties.83 For example, the CFPB can 
distribute its Consumer Financial Civil Penalty Fund, which is already 
quite large,84 without any oversight from another branch of government. 
                                                          
81 See Jill Treanor, £450m Libor fines given to military-related charities and 
schemes, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 16, 2015, 11:54 AM), https://perma.cc/J9GF-
HK7B. 
82 See Mikey Smith & Dan Bloom, Budget 2016 at a glance: All George 
Osborne's key announcements, MIRROR (Mar. 17, 2016, 9:12 AM), 
https://perma.cc/KRP3-HB8D; see also The Budget & Parliament, 
WWW.PARLIAMENT.UK, https://perma.cc/WJQ3-KKXA (last visited Apr. 12, 
2017). 
83 The Commodity Futures Trading Commission has a fund that can be used for 
customer education purposes in addition to payments to whistleblowers. See 7 
U.S.C. §26(g) (2012).  
The 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act established a 
penalty fund for the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services to “improve[] 
the lives of nursing home residents rather than [making] direct payments to 
victims of harm.” See 42 U.S.C. 1395i-3(h)(2)(B)(ii) (2012); see also 
CHAIRWOMAN OF SUBCOMM. ON FIN. INST. & CONSUMER CREDIT ET. AL, CFPB, 
OPPORTUNITY EXISTS TO IMPROVE TRANSPARENCY OF CIV. PENALTY FUND 
ACTIVITIES, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF. 1 (June 2014), 
https://perma.cc/LQ8B-H95C [hereinafter “GAO report”]. While funds are 
supposed to be used for the benefit of nursing home residents, the federal 
government has given states “wide flexibility in using federal penalty funds and 
has encouraged states to be more creative in the use of penalty funds.” See 
Theodore Tsoukalis et. al., The Collection and Use of Funds From Civil Money 
Penalties and Fines From Nursing Homes, 46 THE GERONTOLOGIST 6, 759 
(2006), https://perma.cc/5XLR-YTHA. Dodd-Frank established the SEC’s 
Investor Protection Fund in 2010, which funds payments to whistleblowers and 
funds the SEC’s Inspector General. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(g)(2)(A)-(B) (2012). 
84 The total amount collected as of September 30, 2016, according to the Bureau, 
is $526 million. See About us, Civil Penalty Fund, CFPB, 
https://perma.cc/7U7S-VUW3/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2017). However, a 
September 2016 settlement with Wells Fargo requires the bank to pay $100 
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The Bureau can deposit civil monetary penalties into the fund to 
compensate eligible victims and for “consumer education and financial 
literacy programs,” which the statute does not define.85  
Although authorized by statute, the CFPB’s ability to direct 
funds to third parties raises concerns about windfalls to favored 
organizations. Moreover, according to the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO), the “CFPB did not document the factors the Fund 
Administrator considered in determining the allocation of funds for 
consumer education and financial literacy programs for the first 
allocation period.”86 Additionally, the existence of the fund and 
possibility for abuse has been criticized.87 By contrast, as the GAO report 
notes, the DOJ does not have a penalty fund and penalties are generally 
not paid to consumers,88 and the law requires the DOJ to deposit into the 
Treasury any money paid to a court or received by court officers 
(attorneys) in any case pending or adjudicated in court.89 
As of March 2016, the CFPB’s penalty fund had $15.7 million 
remaining to allocate to consumer victims or educational programs.90 
According to the CFPB’s website, to date, only one initiative has been 
funded.91 This program is a financial coaching initiative partnering with 
the Department of Labor (DOL) and “more than two dozen non-profit 
social-services providers to place 60 certified coaches in DOL American 
                                                                                                                                  
million to the penalty fund, which would substantially increase the total amount 
collected. See Consumer Fin. Protection Bureau Fines Wells Fargo $100 
Million for Widespread Illegal Practice of Secretly Opening Unauthorized 
Accounts, CFPB (Sept. 8, 2016), https://perma.cc/3K39-XHGX. 
85 See 12 U.S.C. § 5497(d)(2) (2012). The civil penalty fund was established by 
the Dodd-Frank Act and is codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5497(d)(1). 
86 See GAO report, supra note 83, at 23. 
87 See Inv. Bus. Daily, supra note 64.  
88 See id. 
89 See 28 U.S.C. § 2041 (2012). Other agencies, such as the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 
and the FTC can collect civil monetary penalties. However, these agencies do 
not have the statutory authority to establish a fund, and their civil penalties must 
be transferred directly to the Treasury. See GAO report, supra note 83, at 18. 
Unless Congress passes a law authorizing such a fund, the money goes to the 
Treasury. Id.  
90 See CFO update for the third quarter of fiscal year 2016, CFPB (Aug. 17, 
2016), available at https://perma.cc/L6RV-GD9R. 
91 See Civ. Penalty Fund: Consumer Educ. and Fin. Literacy, CFPB, 
https://perma.cc/MQ4Y-FNKF (last visited Apr. 12, 2017). 
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Job Centers and community-centered non-profits across the country.”92 
Host sites include non-profits,93 workforce resource centers and 
development boards, legal aid services, homeless shelters, and advocacy 
groups.94 The 2015 annual report indicates that in 2013, the CFPB had 
allocated $13.4 million to consumer education and financial literacy 
programs, meaning that all of this money should have been donated to 
the non-profits involved in the financial coaching initiative.95 
The CFPB also entered a settlement agreement that contains 
consumer relief provisions similar to those in the recent DOJ-bank 
settlements. In December 2013, the CFPB and every state except 
Oklahoma settled with Ocwen, a mortgage servicing provider, for 
alleged violations of state consumer protection laws and Title X of 
Dodd-Frank.96 The Ocwen settlement provides for a $123.7 million 
payment to an escrow account for the purpose of dispensing cash 
payments to eligible foreclosed borrowers from 2009 through 2012.97 
The settlement describes these cash payments as remedial to offset the 
reduction in proceeds for which Ocwen was responsible due to the 
foreclosure.98 In addition, the agreement provides $2 billion in consumer 
relief, including relief to certain borrowers who are currently delinquent 
on payment or in imminent risk of default; have a home that is worth less 
than the loan; and have certain income deficiencies.99  
C. Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution 
Agreements 
                                                          
92 Daniel Dodd-Ramirez & Holly Petraeus, The launch of the CFPB financial 
coaching initiative, CFPB (May 20, 2015), https://perma.cc/Y7ZR-W8T2. 
93 Id. 
94 For example, the Mississippi Center for Justice is one such advocacy group, 
and it claims that it is “advancing racial and economic justice through an 
approach that combines legal services with policy advocacy, community 
education and media advocacy.” See About the Center, MISS. CTR. FOR JUST., 
https://perma.cc/QR4S-FRVF (last visited Apr. 12, 2017). 
95 See Fin. report of the Consumer Fin. Protection Bureau, FY 2015, CPFB, 
https://perma.cc/5JL2-V3WS (Nov. 16, 2015). 
96 Consent Judgment, CFPB v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., No. 13-cv-2025, 2014 WL 
1652004, (KY Dep’t. of Fin. Inst., Feb. 26, 2014), https://perma.cc/2A5N-
ETWR. 
97 Id. 
98 Exhibit C, Ocwen Fin. Corp., 2014 WL 1652004 (KY Dep’t. of Fin. Inst., 
2014), https://perma.cc/KB97-YHV9. 
99 Id. 
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The settlement agreements between the DOJ and several large 
banks are just a small subset of settlement agreements between the 
government and corporations that raise accountability and transparency 
questions The DOJ’s criminal settlement guidelines prohibit these types 
of payments to third-party beneficiaries in criminal settlements.100 Yet, 
the evidence shows that the DOJ has crafted criminal settlements with 
similar types of payments as found in the bank settlements. Between 
1997 and 2011, there were 157 non-prosecution agreements (NPAs) and 
deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) with publicly-held 
corporations.101 In 2015 alone, the DOJ entered into 100 agreements with 
corporations, more than triple the previous year, to resolve allegedly 
criminal and civil violations of the law.102  
There is evidence that the government has used its settlement 
leverage in recent corporate criminal settlements cases to diverted funds 
to third party non-profits and other causes.103 One such non-profit, the 
                                                          
100 OFFICES OF THE U.S. ATTORNEYS, U. S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-16.325, 
PLEA AGREEMENTS, DEFERRED PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS, NON-PROSECUTION 
AGREEMENTS AND EXTRAORDINARY RESTITUTION (2010), available at 
https://perma.cc/FMM4-5MPM.  
Plea agreements, deferred prosecution agreements and non-
prosecution agreements should not include terms requiring the 
defendant to pay funds to a charitable, educational, community, 
or other organization or individual that is not a victim of the 
criminal activity or is not providing services to redress the harm 
caused by the defendant's criminal conduct. Such payments 
have sometimes been referred to as ‘extraordinary restitution.’ 
This is a misnomer, however, as restitution is intended to 
restore the victim's losses caused by the criminal conduct, not 
to provide funds to an unrelated third party. Apart from the 
limited circumstances described below, this practice is 
restricted because it can create actual or perceived conflicts of 
interest and/or other ethical issues.  
Id. 
101 Cindy R. Alexander and Mark A. Cohen, Trends in the Use of Non-
Prosecution, Deferred Prosecution, & Plea Agreements in the Settlement of 
Alleged Corporate Criminal Wrongdoing, SEARLE CIV. JUST. INST., LAW & 
ECON. CTR, GEORGE MASON UNIV. (Apr. 2015), https://perma.cc/2JM2-NAAF. 
102 See 2015 Year End Update on Corp. Non-Prosecution and Deferred 
Prosecution Agreements, GIBSON DUNN (Jan. 5, 2016), https://perma.cc/5ZSY-
ZFGT. 
103 Inst. for Legal Reform, Profit Over Principle: How Law Enforcement for Fin. 
Gain Undermines the Public Interest & Congress’s Control of Federal 
Spending, in ENFORCEMENT SLUSH FUNDS, 17 (2015), https://perma.cc/A9S8-
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National Fish and Wildlife Foundation, “supports conservation efforts in 
all 50 states and U.S. territories,” and its grants “are rigorously evaluated 
and awarded to some of the nation’s largest environmental organizations, 
as well as some of the smallest.”104 In 2012, for example, Gibson Guitar 
was required to donate $50,000 to the National Fish and Wildlife 
Foundation, and British Petroleum was required to donate $2.5 billion to 
the same nonprofit in settlement of its alleged wrongdoing in the Gulf of 
Mexico oil spill.105 In another example, a 2005 deferred prosecution 
agreement involving Bristol Myers Squibb required the corporation to 
endow a chair of business ethics at the prosecutor’s private, religiously-
affiliated law school alma mater, Seton Hall University Law School.106  
Because of their often out-of-court nature and non-criminal 
provisions such as corporate governance reforms and third party 
donations, NPAs and DPAs raise concerns. NPAs and DPAs often 
resolve both criminal and civil claims, and in some cases may not even 
detail the difference.107 Criminal indictments, or even the appearance of 
criminal allegations, can be harmful to corporations; Arthur Andersen’s 
indictment and subsequent conviction led to loss of its accounting license 
and the firm went bankrupt.108  
The DOJ has come under criticism for its structuring of 
corporate settlements. These settlements have been criticized as a “get-
out-of-jail free card[]” by some in favor of more stringent penalties, such 
as Senator Elizabeth Warren.109 On the other side of the debate, Professor 
Richard Epstein has described some DOJ settlements “as battered 
                                                                                                                                  
VVGN. 
104 About Us, NATIONAL FISH & WILDLIFE FOUNDATION, 
https://perma.cc/2Z3W-XMLH (last visited Apr. 12, 2017). 
105 Profit Over Principle, supra note 103. 
106 See Bristol-Meyers Squibb Deferred Prosecution Agreement (Jun. 15, 2005), 
available at https://perma.cc/V7FL-D6GH. Then U.S. Attorney Chris Christie 
came under criticism for this agreement’s provision awarding money to his law 
school alma mater. See e.g., Greg Gordon, Wanna Settle? Give $5 Million to 
Chris Christie's Law School, MCCLATCHY (Feb. 11, 2014, 12:33 PM), 
https://perma.cc/5E8D-2BZY. 
107 See Credit Lyonnais Settlement Agreement, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ OFFICE (Jun. 
7, 1999), https://perma.cc/8L55-6UN3. (“[I]ntentional wrongdoing . . . that may 
have violated United States Laws.”). Id. 
108 Andersen Surrenders Licenses To Practice Accounting in U.S., WALL ST. J. 
(Sept. 2, 2002, 8:39 PM), https://perma.cc/4PQY-M8DF. 
109 Zach Carter, Elizabeth Warren Hammers The Endless Failures Of Wall 
Street Regulators, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 15, 2015, 6:10 PM), 
https://perma.cc/5CYQ-TUP7. 
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corporations recant[ing] their past sins and submit[ing] to punishments 
wildly in excess of any underlying offense.”110 No matter which side of 
the debate one takes, the inclusion of hard-to-value benefits to third 
parties makes it harder to assess whether the settlement is appropriate. 
DOJ officials are subject to the same public choice 
considerations as any other government official and may have political or 
career-oriented incentives to settle with corporations.111 The DOJ has 
repeatedly used its settlement leverage to settle with corporations for 
large sums of money,112 indicating that the terms of DOJ-involved 
settlement agreements should be scrutinized.113 Regardless of whether 
settlements are civil or criminal in nature, Congress should not allow the 
Executive Branch to divert settlement funds to its chosen causes.114 
VI. LEGAL POLICY ANALYSIS OF THIRD PARTY PAYMENTS 
Many recent DOJ settlements with financial institutions 
allegedly right wrongs to the government, but the nature of the 
settlements reflects something different. Some of these settlements 
contain relief provisions that seem to be less about compensating 
government for harms done to it than making amends for the financial 
crisis and related recession. Through grants of money to individuals and 
                                                          
110 Richard A. Epstein, The Deferred Prosecution Racket, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 28, 
2006, 12:01 AM), https://perma.cc/WCP2-CZG9. 
111 See Michael Patrick Wilt, Who Watches the Watchmen? Accountability in 
Federal Corporate Criminal Prosecution Agreements, 43 AM. J. CRIM. L. 61 
(2016), https://perma.cc/C2A3-55BM. 
112 Epstein, supra note 110. 
113 The debate over the use and scope of NPAs and DPAs is beyond the scope of 
this article. See, e.g., Wilt, supra note 111, at 66-70; see also Cindy R. 
Alexander & Mark A. Cohen, The Evolution of Corporate Criminal Settlement: 
An Empirical Perspective of Non-Prosecution, Deferred Prosecution, & Plea 
Agreements, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 537 (2015), https://perma.cc/7K38-E5ZN; 
Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 861-74 
(2007). 
114 In fact, the Congress may itself be violating the appropriations clause of the 
Constitution by failing to provide effective control over appropriations made by 
the federal government. See Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 YALE 
L.J. 1343, 1345 (1988) (“Congress itself might violate the appropriations clause 
by failing to exercise effective controls over federal expenditures.”);  but see J. 
Gregory Sidak, The President’s Power of the Purse, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1162, 
1164-73 (1989) for criticisms of Professor Stith’s interpretation of the 
appropriations power as it applies to Congressional de-funding of the President’s 
constitutional prerogatives. 
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institutions not directly affected by the settling bank’s conduct, these 
banks do public penance for their role in the financial crisis. The DOJ’s 
role is to pursue specified violations of the law, obtain relief, and impose 
penalties authorized under the relevant statutes.  
The DOJ should enforce the laws as they are written, and the 
settlements should be tailored to respond to the laws a company is 
deemed to have violated. These laws have defined penalties, fines, and 
monetary payments that give notice to potential violators and constrain 
the government to a just and efficient outcome. If the DOJ settles a case 
with provisions for consumer relief, these provisions must be tied to the 
underlying violation of the law. The DOJ does not have the legal 
authority to create new penalties or other forms of payments by settling 
parties. Settlements that direct funds to satisfy extra-statutory purposes 
not only call into question the legitimacy of the particular enforcement 
action, but raise broader constitutional concerns. 
As both the DOJ’s own criminal sentencing guidance and the 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines indicate for corporate criminal cases, 
community service requirements involving charitable donations must be 
directly connected to the alleged offense. Providing people with housing 
counseling or refinancing their mortgages, unless for the purpose of 
helping those directly harmed by a particular legal violation, do not 
comport with the spirit of these guidelines. 
A. The Appropriations Power 
Several commentators and legal academics have raised the 
separation of powers doctrine and the congressional appropriations 
power arguments against the continued distribution of settlement funds 
to third parties.115 Under the constitutional separation of powers 
principle, different branches of government hold different, 
                                                          
115 See Larkin, supra note 67; Figley, supra note 66; see also Settling the 
Question: Did Bank Settlement Agreement Subvert Congressional 
Appropriations Powers? Hearing Before the U.S. H. R. Comm. on Fin. Services, 
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, (2016) (testimony of Nicholas 
Quinn Rosenkranz, Professor of Law, Georgetown University), 
https://perma.cc/37V8-GJ6T. There is also a possibility that the distributions 
also could violate the non-delegation doctrine in the Constitution, as Congress 
has not provided an “intelligible principle” for delegating its authority. See, e.g., 
Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001). 
Moreover, it is arguable whether Congress even may not be permitted to 
delegate its appropriations and lawmaking power in this manner. See, e.g., 
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 488 (1998). 
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complimentary powers; powers are not accumulated in the hands of any 
one branch.116 Dividing government power helps to prevent government 
officials from exploiting citizens for their own enrichment.117 
One of the most important separators of power is that Congress 
levies taxes and holds the “power of the purse,” i.e., the power to spend 
money from the Treasury for constitutionally appropriate purposes. The 
Executive Branch is charged with implementing Congress’s spending 
initiatives. Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution grants sole power to 
Congress to “lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the 
debts,” and Article I, Section 9 provides that “No Money shall be drawn 
from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by 
Law.”
118  
Each of the following subsections will look at the appropriations 
power from different angles: statutory and constitutional, economic, and 
a policymaking perspective. 
i. Constitutional and Statutory Analysis 
The Constitution is clear that the exercise of the appropriations 
power must be deliberate and limited by the Constitution and the laws.119 
Giving the legislature alone the power to spend reflects James Madison’s 
belief that the separation of powers and the checks and balances that 
maintain it would be bolstered by the ambition of each independent 
branch of government: “Ambition must be made to counteract 
ambition.”
120 By vesting the power to appropriate in the legislative 
branch, the Founders intended elected representatives to make decisions 
about where to spend the people’s money. Accordingly, it is “the 
legislative department alone [that] has access to the pockets of the 
people.”
121  
The Framers based the separation of powers and the 
appropriation of money on the lessons learned before the revolution: the 
Crown had often attempted to circumvent Parliament by raising money 
from private sources and distributing the money without the input of 
                                                          
116 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (JAMES MADISON) 
117 See, e.g., Stefan Voigt, Constitutional Design of Lawmaking, in PRODUCTION 
OF LEGAL RULES, 9-11 (Francisco N. Parisi 2011). 
118 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; id. § 9, cl. 7. 
119 Stith, supra note 114, at 1347. 
120 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison). 
121 THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison). 
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Parliament.122 The Framers of the Constitution recognized that control 
over the power of the purse was an ideal means to prevent executive 
tyranny.123 Recently, the House of Representatives successfully defended 
its power to appropriate in U.S. House of Rep. v. Burwell,124 in which the 
court explained “appropriations are an integral part of our constitutional 
checks and balances, insofar as they tie the Executive Branch to the 
Legislative Branch via purse strings.” 
Appropriations are also not just setting aside amounts of money; 
the legislative power to appropriate defines the “character, extent, and 
scope of authorized activities.”125 The appropriations power also protects 
the policy priorities of the federal government.126 If the money dedicated 
to consumer and third-party relief is not “public money” under the 
Constitution, then the government is not entitled to require that it be 
spent.127 If it is the public’s money, then it is the legislative branch, not 
the Executive, that must decide and account for, where and how that 
money is spent.128 
Congress has sought to protect its power by enacting the 
Miscellaneous Receipts Act of 1849129 and the Anti-Deficiency Act.130 In 
these two statutes, Congress has created a “well-constructed statutory 
defense of its constitutional appropriations prerogative.”131 The 
Miscellaneous Receipts Act requires that agencies and officials in 
government deposit money into the Treasury as soon as practical, 
preventing agencies from self-funding based on enforcements or 
judgments in their favor.132 The key term in the statute is receipts: the 
government official must actually receive or should have received the 
money for the law to be operable.133  
                                                          
122 Todd D. Peterson, Protecting the Appropriations Power: Why Congress 
Should Care About Settlements at the Department of Justice, 2009 BYU L. REV. 
327, 330 (2009). 
123 See id. at 330. 
124 185 F. Supp. 3d 165,170 (D.D.C. 2016). 
125 Stith, supra note 114, at 1356. 
126 See Peterson, supra note 122, at 330. 
127 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. 
128 Peterson, supra note 122, at 335-36. 
129 See generally Miscellaneous Receipts Act of 1849, 31 U.S.C. § 3302 (1994) 
130 See generally Antideficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (1990). 
131 Peterson, supra note 122, at 342. 
132 See, e.g., Randal J. Meyer, Congress’s Diminishing Power of the Purse, THE 
CATO INST. (Dec. 9, 2015, 11:33 AM), https://perma.cc/L2HB-DXQZ. 
133 Effect of 31 U.S.C. § 484 on the Settlement Authority of the Att’y Gen. 4B 
U.S. OP. OFF. LEGAL COUNSEL 684, 688 (1980). 
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The DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel interprets the law as 
permitting third party payments so long as the settlement is made before 
an admission or finding of liability and the government does not retain 
control post-settlement over distribution of the funds.134 As C. Boyden 
Gray notes, however, this interpretation is “twisted in knots” and not 
grounded in the text of the law.135 Unconditional gifts or donations must 
be deposited into the Treasury like any other funds.136 Congress must 
provide specific statutory authority for the government to be able to 
accept a conditional donation – one dedicated to a specific purpose, like 
settling an enforcement action.137  
The Anti-Deficiency Act is another congressional attempt to 
prevent the Executive Branch from appropriating money without 
authorization from Congress. The law prevents government officials 
from committing to or making expenditures in excess of the 
appropriations provided for by law.138 Professor Larkin and others have 
argued that the bank settlements violate the Anti-Deficiency Act because 
the Executive Branch is committing money that Congress has not 
appropriated to third parties.139 The law prohibits government officials 
from contractually obligating the government to spend money in excess 
of appropriations authorized by Congress.140 Legal settlements are 
ostensibly contractual obligations:141 in exchange for not enforcing legal 
rights of the United States, the government arranges for the defendant to 
provide consumer relief. Congress has not appropriated or authorized 
                                                          
134 See Deputy Assist’t Att’y Gen’l C. Kevin Marshall, Off. of Legal Couns., 
Dep’t. of Justice, Application of the Government Corp. Control Act and the 
Miscellaneous Receipts Act to the Canadian Softwood Lumber Settlement 
Agreement, Memo. Opinion for the Gen’l Counsel U.S. Trade Rep. (Aug. 22, 
2006). 
135 Settling the Question: Did Bank Settlement Agreements Subvert Cong. 
Appropriations Powers? Before the Subcomm. On Oversight and Investigations 
of the H. R. Comm. On Fin. Servs., 114th Cong. 19 (2016) (statement of 
Ambassador C. Boyden Gray). 
136 Stith, supra note 114, at 1368 n.123. 
137 Id. at 1368. 
138 Antideficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (1990); see also U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., Anti-Deficiency Act, https://perma.cc/L4LF-FT4C (last 
visited Jan. 1, 2017). 
139 See Larkin, supra note 67, at 16. 
140 Stith, supra note 114, at 1374. 
141 Contracts are an agreement, with sufficient consideration, to do or not do a 
particular thing. See Contracts BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (2nd ed. 1995). 
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such expenditures, so these settlements arguably violate the Anti-
Deficiency Act. 
Federal law also requires that “[a]ll moneys paid into any court 
of the United States, or received by the officers thereof, in any case 
pending or adjudicated in such court, shall be forthwith deposited with 
the Treasurer of the United States.”142 While the DOJ would likely argue 
that it has not received any moneys paid “in any case pending,” arguably 
the diverted money should have been received by government officials 
instead of third parties.143  
The recent bank settlements attempt to evade the constitutional 
and statutory requirements by directly transferring the money from the 
defendant to third parties. The banks directly donate money to a variety 
of causes and consumers. The banks have a menu of options and can 
choose who receives the funds, but the settlement agreement defines the 
boundaries of those choices. No money technically passes through the 
hands of government officials,144 but government officials chart its 
course.  
Some claims to the contrary cite145 executive agency 
interpretations, including one from the DOJ,146 and a holding by the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that held:  
 
While it is clear that a court cannot order a defendant 
in a citizens' suit to make payments to an organization 
other than the U.S. treasury, this prohibition does not 
extend to a settlement agreement whereby the 
defendant does not admit liability and the court is not 
ordering non-consensual monetary relief.147 
 
However, in the settlements discussed in this article, the defendants are 
admitting some liability. The Miscellaneous Receipts Act does not 
permit third party payments as found in these recent settlements. Even if 
                                                          
142 28 U.S.C. § 2041 (2012). 
143 See Larkin, supra note 67, at 16. 
144 See generally Settling the Question: Did Bank Settlement Agreements Subvert 
Cong. Appropriations Powers? Before the Subcomm. On Oversight and 
Investigations of the H. R. Comm. On Fin. Servs., 114th Cong. (2016) (written 
testimony of David K. Min). 
145 See id. 
146 See Marshall, supra note 134, at 8. 
147 See Sierra Club v. Elec. Controls Design, Inc., 909 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 
1990). 
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the bank settlement consumer relief provisions are truly conditional 
“donations,” then Congress would have to statutorily authorize the DOJ 
to spend that money via settlement. 
ii. Constitutional Economics 
Economics applied to political decision-making, public choice 
theory, can also shed light on why the appropriations power is and 
should remain in the hands of the legislative branch: legislative action is 
usually harder to accomplish than executive action. The Constitution was 
designed to both raise and lower transaction costs, depending on the 
particular governmental task involved.148 Higher transaction costs limit 
the scope of government, but the division of labor between the three 
branches of government can lower costs by allowing each branch to 
specialize.149 Clearly, the Constitution requires Congress to specialize in 
appropriating. However, Congress does not act alone; the Executive 
Branch has the power of the veto, its own check on the appropriations 
power.  
Enacting legislation entails greater transaction costs than issuing 
an executive order.150 Legislation involves the consent of two branches 
of government, or a supermajority in Congress, if overriding a veto, and 
the coalition-building of many different political actors. Securing 
passage of legislation also requires interest groups to have influence with 
more than one branch of government, raising the cost of lobbying.151 The 
separation of powers likely “exerts an upward pressure on costs.”152 
Money that is in the Treasury can be appropriated only after an intense, 
costly legislative process.153 Moreover, a properly designed 
constitutional structure can help minimize rent-seeking, or at least 
coercive, inefficient transfers of wealth.154 
                                                          
148 Richard A. Posner, The Constitution as an Economic Document, 56 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 4, 12 (1987). 
149 Id. 
150 Robert D. Cooter, The Strategic Constitution, Princeton U. Press 310 (2000), 
https://perma.cc/SJ6M-ZVDT. 
151 Id. at 333.  
152 Morris Silver, Economic Theory of the Constitutional Separation of Powers, 
29 PUB. CHOICE 95, 101 (1977). 
153 See Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of 
the Public Choice Model: An Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 VA. L. 
REV. 471, 481 (1988).  
154 Id. at 494. 
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The separation of powers and checks and balances, when 
working together, improve political accountability to the public.155 
Specifically, the “key condition to make separation of powers work in 
favor of voters is that no policy can be implemented unilaterally, i.e., 
without the consent of both bodies.”156 The separation of powers reduces 
the government’s monopoly of power over citizens.157 By dividing 
sovereignty into an oligopoly of three equal branches with reciprocal 
controls over each other, such as the appropriations power and the veto, 
the Constitution forces the branches to compete with each other for the 
citizens’ favors.158 By forcing the two political branches to compete, 
compromise, and work together in a complicated appropriations process, 
the Constitution provides voters with a greater ability to hold political 
leaders accountable and to elicit information from them.159 
iii. Congress is the Government’s Policymaker 
through its Appropriations Power 
Congress should decide where taxpayer money should be spent. 
Appropriations decisions are policy decisions. Unlike members of 
Congress, officials in the DOJ are not elected and only the top officials at 
the DOJ are appointed by the President.160 Most DOJ employees are, 
therefore, not directly accountable to the public for their decisions. DOJ 
staff may impose their own policy preferences in settlement agreements 
with corporations, either out of sincere public interest purpose or for 
personal reasons, such as career advancement.161   
Moreover, settlement negotiations lack the transparency of the 
congressional appropriations process. Government enforcement officials 
should not make decisions that are constitutionally and statutorily 
restricted to Congress.162 Some have criticized the DOJ’s use of the 
settlement authority before the recent bank settlements. For example, 
earlier settlements have required, as a condition of settlement, 
environmental cleanup projects that otherwise would have been paid for 
                                                          
155 Torsten Persson, Gerard Roland, & Guido Tabellini, Separation of Powers 
and Political Accountability, 112 QUART. J. OF ECON. 1163, 1166 (1997). 
156 Id. 
157 Silver, supra note 152, at 98. 
158 See id. 
159 See id. 
160 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
161 See Wilt, supra note 111, at 79. 
162 See Petersen, supra note 122, at 330. 
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by the United States, as well as making payments to private parties for 
political reasons when a private party sues the federal government.163 
B. Statutory Liability Only Allows Payments to the 
Federal Government, Not Third Parties 
The injured party settling claims in all of the settlements was the 
United States (as well as States).164 The bank settlements are based 
largely on laws that protect the government from fraud. The False Claims 
Act and FIRREA, both of which protect the government from fraud, are 
two statutes that figure prominently in the bank settlements. 
i. The False Claims Act and FIRREA Provide 
for Penalties and Restitution to the 
Government, Not Private Parties 
Congress enacted the False Claims Act 165 in 1863 in response 
to fraud by suppliers of goods to the Army during the Civil War.166 It 
remains the government’s primary tool to protect itself from fraudulent 
claims by its business partners.167 Any person who “knowingly presents, 
or causes to be presented, [to the U.S. government] a false or fraudulent 
claim for payment or approval” or “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to 
be made or used, a false record or statement material to a false or 
fraudulent claim” is liable to the government for a penalty of $5500 to 
$11,000168 in damages per false claim plus treble damages.169 Either the 
Attorney General or a private person may bring an action under the False 
Claims Act.170 The False Claims Act does not provide for remediation or 
                                                          
163 Id. at 348. 
164 See, e.g., Bank of America Settlement, supra note 6, at 1 (“The United States, 
the States, and Bank of America are collectively referred to herein as “the 
Parties.”). 
165 False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C.A. 3729 (West 2009). 
162 See, e.g., Bank of America Settlement, supra note 6, at 3. 
167 James B. Helmer, Jr., False Claims Act: Incentivizing Integrity for 150 Years 
for Rogues, Privateers, Parasites, and Patriots, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1261, 1261 
(Sept. 18, 2013), https://perma.cc/5MBM-MQ4V. 
168 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(A),(B) (West 2009). 
169 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B) (2012). 
170 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2012). When a private person brings an action under 
the law, the action is called a qui tam and the private person is referred to as a 
relator. See Qui Tam BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (2nd ed. 1995). The relator 
receives a portion of the funds generated for the government by the litigation. 
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restitution to anyone but the government and, if relevant, the private 
initiator of a False Claims action. Monetary payments in False Claims 
Act settlements should compensate the government for its injuries. 171 
The False Claims Act is intended to recover what is essentially stolen 
money. 
FIRREA’s civil liability provisions outlaw fraud against the 
government as an insurer of a financial institution. Congress passed 
FIRREA in 1989 as a “broad legislative attempt to resolve the financial 
crisis confronting the [Savings and Loan (S&L)] industry.”172 In addition 
to significant regulatory oversight changes and reorganization in the 
federal government,173 the law included civil liability provisions intended 
to prevent fraudulent activity affecting banks. The law allows the 
Attorney General to bring a FIRREA civil action against anyone who 
allegedly commits a crime in connection with a financial institution.174 
These crimes include bribery, bank theft, false entries, false statements, 
criminal false claims, mail fraud, and wire fraud.175 The DOJ has relied 
increasingly on FIRREA in recent years.176 
                                                                                                                                  
The government may choose to step in and continue the case on its own. See § 
3730(d). 
171 See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Recovers Over $3.5 
Billion From False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2015 (Dec. 3, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/67RW-MYEJ. 
172 Anthony C. Providenti, Jr., Playing with FIRREA, Not Getting Burned: 
Statutory Overview of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and 
Enforcement Act of 1989, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 323, 325 (1991). 
173 See e.g., Michael P. Malloy, Nothing to Fear but FIRREA Itself: Revising 
and Reshaping the Enforcement Process of Federal Bank Regulation, 50 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1117, 1137 (1989). 
174 12 U.S.C. §1833a(a), (e) (2006). 
175 Bribery is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 215 (2000). Bank Theft is codified at 18 
U.S.C. § 656 (2000). False Entries is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1005 (2006). False 
Statements is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006). Criminal False Claims is 
codified at18 U.S.C. § 287 (1986). Mail Fraud is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1341 
(2012).  Finally, Wire Fraud is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2008). The latter 
two crimes are broad and frequently charged by federal prosecutors in cases 
involving the mob and terrorism. See, e.g., Christopher M. Matthews, 
Prosecutors Broadly Use Mail-Fraud, Wire-Fraud Statutes, WALL ST. J. (Jun. 9, 
2015, 1:26 PM), https://perma.cc/TUF8-T7GW. 
176 See Stephanie Russell-Kraft, $1.38B S&P Settlement Cements FIRREA As 
DOJ Darling, LAW360 (Feb. 3, 2015, 6:33 PM), https://perma.cc/7HMX-SX2B; 
see also Peter J. Henning, U.S. Finds Fresh Use for Seldom-Used Statute in 
Subprime Cases, NY TIMES, (Aug. 11, 2014, 11:33 AM), 
https://perma.cc/9XRD-XDS8.  
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The use of FIRREA against financial institutions for wrongdoing 
involving their own institution is controversial,177 but courts have 
allowed the government to use FIRREA in this way.178 FIRREA allows 
the government to allege criminal wrongdoing, but to prove the elements 
of the crime only by a preponderance of the evidence.179 The government 
may prefer an action under FIRREA, which offers penalties 
unconstrained by the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines180 and a lower burden 
of proof, than to a criminal action.   
Like the False Claims Act, FIRREA’s civil penalties are not 
designed to compensate victims, let alone unrelated third parties. The law 
“assesses a sum of money that is paid to the government rather than 
providing for compensatory damages to be paid to the injured parties.”181 
                                                                                                                                  
Several law firms have written about the DOJ’s use of FIRREA to 
induce financial institutions to settle claims relating to the financial crisis. See, 
e.g., Jones Day, FIRREA Civ. Monetary Penalties: The Gov’t’s Newfound 
Weapon Against Fin. Fraud (May 2013), https://perma.cc/9X73-XTDG; Boris 
Bershteyn & John K. Carroll, Dusting Off FIRREA: Old Statute Poses 
Challenges for Fin. Institutions, Skadden’s 2015 Insights – Fin. Reg. (Jan. 
2015), https://perma.cc/LU3S-HSCW. 
177 See generally U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, The FIRREA 
Revival: Dredging Up Solutions to the Fin. Crisis, (2014), 
https://perma.cc/9ZG6-WDQX. 
178 See, e.g., Filmon M. Sexton IV, Note and Comment, The Fin. Institutions 
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989: The Effect of the “Self-
Affecting” Theory on Fin. Institutions, 19 N.C. BANKING INST. 263 (2015) 
(discussing the gov’t’s theory in applying FIRREA to banks for their own 
conduct); see generally U.S. ex rel. O’Donnell v. Bank of America Corp., 33 
F.Supp.3d 494 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); United States v. Menendez, No. CV 11-06313, 
2013 WL 828926 (C.D. Cal. 2013)). 
179 12 U.S.C. §1833a(f) (2012). 
180 See generally Organizational Guidelines, U.S. Sentencing Commission, 
https://perma.cc/DPF6-WP2Q. 
181 Nan S. Ellis, Steven B. Dow, & David Safavian, Use of FIRREA to Impose 
Liability in the Wake of the Global Fin. Crisis: A New Weapon in the Arsenal to 
Prevent Financial Fraud, 18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 119, 148 (2015). 
One of the hallmarks of civil liability is its compensatory 
nature; the money damage judgments imposed on defendants 
primarily serve to compensate injured plaintiffs. This is one of 
the key characteristics that sets civil liability apart from 
criminal liability. FIRREA does not appear to serve this 
compensatory goal because it assesses a sum of money that is 
paid to the government rather than providing for compensatory 
damages to be paid to the injured parties. 
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FIRREA’s purpose is to compensate the government and society for 
losses from fraudulent activity.182 FIRREA is the federal government’s 
exclusive domain, private parties cannot bring a FIRREA action.183 
The False Claims Act and FIRREA do not permit relief to third 
parties or private victims. These laws are designed to recompense the 
government for losses incurred and to deter future fraudulent activity 
against the government or federally insured financial institutions through 
penalties. Additionally, the False Claims Act provides for monetary 
rewards for whistleblowers who have alerted the government of fraud.184 
Neither law authorizes the distribution of money to nongovernmental 
parties, such as homeowners, let alone unharmed consumers or third 
party non-profit organizations. Just as it would be inappropriate for a 
private attorney to settle a case on behalf of her clients by agreeing to a 
payment to a third-party, it is inappropriate for government attorneys to 
settle claims on behalf of the American people by directing payments to 
a third party.185  
ii. Consumer Relief Provisions Do Not 
Constitute Restitution or Remediation 
 Proponents of the consumer relief provisions claim that the 
provisions constitute a kind of “restitution” or “remediation” of harm.186 
However, as the DOJ explains, “restitution is intended to restore the 
                                                                                                                                  
Id. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. at 149.  
This is the case with a FIRREA action which may only be 
initiated by the federal government, not by private parties. This 
is a traditional characteristic of both criminal law and modern 
administrative law and distinguishes the statute from a typical 
civil action that is brought by a private party plaintiff. 
Id. The law does provide for limited whistleblower payments to be made. 12 
U.S.C. §1831k(b) (2012); See also Andrew W. Schilling, Should FIRREA 
Whistleblower Bounties Be Higher?, LAW360 (Sept. 29, 2014, 10:00 AM), 
https://perma.cc/9GMV-F2CR. 
184 FIRREA also allows much more limited whistleblower awards. See Financial 
Institutions Anti-Fraud Enforcement Act, 12 U.S.C. § 4205(d) (2006).  
185 See Larkin, supra note 67, at 13. 
186 The Essential Role of Community Service in Addressing the Harm Caused by 
Envtl. Crimes and Other Regulatory Offenses Before the H. R. Jud. Comm. 
Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial, and Antitrust Law, 114th Cong. 
8 (2016) (testimony of David Uhlmann).  
43
Wilt: Evaluating “Consumer Relief” Payments in Recent Bank Settlement A
Published by Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law, 2017
 
 
296 Journal of Business & Securities Law Vol. 17 
victim’s losses caused by the criminal conduct, not to provide funds to an 
unrelated third party.”187 Under FIRREA and the False Claims Act, the 
government is the only victim eligible for restitution. These laws do not 
include provisions for restitution to anyone but the government, nor do 
the laws include provisions for remediation. The DOJ might counter that 
common law claims are the basis of the awards to third parties, but the 
settlement agreements and the DOJ’s own statements about the cases 
suggest that common law claims were not a primary focus.188 
Yet the settlements provide for payments to third parties that are 
cloaked in terms of restitution and remediation. As an example of actual 
restitution, the Ocwen and SunTrust settlements included cash payments 
to foreclosed buyers who suffered harm as a result of the alleged 
conduct.189 The Bank of America agreement refers to its consumer relief 
as remedial in nature.190 The Citigroup settlement uses the term 
“remediate” to describe penalty payments made to the states.191  
Professor David K. Min argues that civil monetary penalties are 
not necessarily tied to restitution or remediation, but serve general 
deterrence purposes and compensate society as a whole.192 Monetary 
penalties deposited into the Treasury are better able to benefit society as 
a whole than consumer relief payments directed to specific parties 
chosen by the defendant bank under guidelines crafted by the DOJ. If 
there is specific harm, then, under a law designed to obtain such relief, a 
                                                          
187 See U.S. Att’y’ Manual 9-16.325, supra note 100. 
188 See U.S. Dep’t of Just., Fed. & State Partners Secure Record $13 Billion 
Global Settlement with JPMorgan for Misleading Investors About Secs. 
Containing Toxic Mortgages (Nov. 19, 2013), https://perma.cc/86BB-CQ62. 
(“Today’s global settlement underscores the power of FIRREA and other civil 
enforcement tools for combatting financial fraud,” said Assistant Attorney 
General for the Civil Division Stuart F. Delery, co-chair of the RMBS Working 
Group). 
189 See Ocwen Settlement, supra note 62; see also SunTrust Settlement, supra 
note 63. 
190 See Bank of America Settlement, supra note 6, at 8 (“In addition, Bank of 
America shall provide $7,000,000,000.00 worth of consumer relief as set forth 
in Annex 2, attached hereto and hereby incorporated as a term of this 
Agreement, to remediate harms resulting from the alleged unlawful conduct of 
Bank of America.”). 
191 See Citigroup Settlement, supra note 6. 
192 See Min, supra note 58, at 8 (“The penalties sought in governmental 
litigation, such as DOJ actions, are generally not based on a theory of 
restitutionary or restorative justice, but rather are based on two different but 
overlapping objections—deterrence and general compensation to society.”). 
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defendant should pay to the specifically harmed parties clearly identified 
in the settlement. If there is generalized harm, then that money should be 
deposited into the only place where society can be compensated: the 
Treasury.  
iii. Consumer Relief Provisions Unnecessarily 
Avoid Statutory Damages Caps 
Some observers contend that consumer relief provisions are a 
prudent way enable the government to avoid statutory damages caps.193 
While this appears to be true – the consumer relief does not count toward 
a penalty or fine under the laws, thus avoiding the cap – it does not seem 
that this is necessary or even prudent policy. For example, the statutory 
cap for FIRREA is $1 million per violation. Given that each transaction 
under FIRREA and the False Claims Act can count as a violation, a 
massive penalty could be assessed for each mortgage affected by the 
bank’s alleged conduct. As Professor Min acknowledges, the government 
would likely not have received much more in statutory penalties had it 
gone to trial and won as compared to the total amount of the settlement, 
not including consumer relief.194  
Thus, the consumer relief enlarges the settlement beyond what 
the government should have been entitled to under the law. Statutory 
damages caps are created for a purpose: to cap the amount that a 
defendant should pay for violating the law. If the consumer relief 
provisions are intended to avoid those caps, this is a questionable legal 
approach. It is not sufficient to argue that the caps should be avoided by 
pursuing charitable donation requirements. Otherwise, prosecutors would 
                                                          
193 Id. at 8. 
For example, one can imagine a situation in which DOJ was 
constrained by statutory caps from seeking more than $100 
million in civil penalties, due to statutory limitations. The 
company may be willing, for various reasons, to accept a 
slightly adjusted civil penalty—say $90 million—and in return 
provide an additional $90 million in charitable donations aimed 
at remediating its wrongful conduct. In such a scenario, the 
overall size of the settlement would be far greater—and thus, 
far more beneficial to the federal government—than the 
alternative of merely seeking civil penalties. 
Id.  
194 Id. (“Thus, it is not clear that DOJ could have procured much more in civil 
penalties than it received from the RMBS settlements, even if it had litigated 
these cases and won, due to FIRREA’s statutory cap on civil penalties.”). 
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have little incentive to pursue cases to trial when they could claim much 
larger settlement amounts by directing every defendant to make 
charitable donations above and beyond the statutory damage cap set by 
Congress. This is not the way our legal system is designed to work. 
C. Third Party Payments are Similar to Cy-Près, 
Without Waiting for Settlement Funds to Actually 
Be Exhausted 
Finally, the third party payments could be seen as an extreme, 
government-sponsored version of cy-près, which is French for “as near 
as possible.”195 Cy-près is a legal process where remaining settlement 
money can be distributed to unrelated third parties after all identifiable 
victims have been paid.196 In 1986, the California Supreme Court, rather 
than ordering the funds to be returned to the defendant, permitted the 
distribution of the remainder of class action settlement funds to third 
parties when the class members could no longer benefit from the 
settlement.197  
Cy-près allows money to be distributed to third parties selected 
by the attorneys and not necessarily related to the original class member 
victims.198 Chief Justice Roberts has called into question the use of cy-
près.199 In the context of the bank settlements, cy-près is inappropriate 
because the government is the victim in these cases, so there will never 
be any funds remaining after the identifiable victims are paid. 
VII. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE SETTLEMENT PROBLEM 
                                                          
195 Cy-pres, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (2nd ed. 1995). 
196 See, generally, Ronald C. Chester, Cy Pres: A Promise Unfulfilled, 54 IND. 
L.J. 407 (1979). 
197 State v. Levi Strauss & Co., 41 Cal. 3d 460, 715 P.2d 564, 224 Cal. Rptr. 605 
(1986). See also Theodore H. Frank, Cy Pres Settlements, The Federalist Society 
(Apr. 04, 2008), https://perma.cc/RRD9-XMZS. 
198 See Hans Bader, Collusive Deals with Class Action Lawyers before the 
Supreme Court, Competitive Enterprise Institute Blog (Mar. 14, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/NU6N-YSQ8; see also Rhonda Wasserman, Cy Pres in Class 
Action Settlements, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 97, 154-56 (2014). 
199 Marek v. Lane, 134 S.Ct. 8, 9 (2013)(stating that the “Court may need to 
clarify the limits on the use of such remedies.”) (statement of Roberts, C.J.). 
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There are several steps that could help the DOJ return to its 
purpose of pursuing clear legal violations and obtaining from violators 
only the types of relief authorized by statute. 
A. DOJ Internal Guidance and Rules 
The DOJ could voluntarily stop the practice of building third 
party payments into settlements. Before the recent bank settlements, one 
author suggested that control over the settlement authority of the DOJ 
should come from the Executive Branch itself.200 The Department could 
create its own guidance regarding settlement best practices that embody a 
respect for the separation of powers and Congress’s appropriations 
authority.201 The DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel would enforce these 
internal rules by offering opinions regarding the legality of 
settlements.202 
Internal guidance by the DOJ on settlement best practices, 
including, how, if, and when settlement money can be diverted to third 
parties and oversight mechanisms, would be a positive step. However, 
only Congress can truly protect its own powers and provide a check on 
the Executive Branch. 
 
B. Prohibiting Government Officials From Negotiating 
Settlements Requiring Donations 
Congress has considered prohibiting funds appropriated for 
salaries and expenses of DOJ personnel from being used to negotiate 
terms in settlement agreements that require payments to third parties.”203 
The amendment was later turned into the Stop Settlement Slush Funds 
Act of 2016, which applies to all agents or officials of the government 
and provides penalties for violating the law.204 As Professor Alan White 
argued in congressional testimony, the banks were not specifically 
                                                          
200 Peterson, supra note 122, at 373. This proposal was made with regard to the 
environmental cleanup and private-party litigation against the United States. Id. 
201 Id. 
202 Id. 
203 The amendment covered agreements that require a defendant to “donate or 
contribute funds to an organization or individual.” See Goodlatte, supra note 71. 
204 See Hearing on H.R. 5063, supra note 74. 
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required to make payments to third party non-profit organizations.205 
Accordingly, the proposed law does not go far enough. 
Structuring settlements to avoid triggering the bill would be 
easy. Each settlement agreement provides a menu of options for the 
bank’s fulfillment of its consumer relief obligations. The agreement 
could offer the defendant a choice to donate money to third parties 
through consumer relief or pay twice as much to the government in a 
fine. In this way, the DOJ could direct payments to third parties without 
mandating them. Another concern with the proposed law is that it does 
not extend to criminal settlements. As former DOJ attorney Paul Figley 
noted in his congressional testimony,206 the government’s leverage in a 
criminal case can be greater than in a civil case. If Congress prohibits 
these payments, it should prohibit the government from using its 
enforcement powers to induce a third-party payment in any settlement. 
Finally, as Figley also argued,207 the proposed law does not 
define donation. Regardless of congressional intent, the Executive 
Branch and courts could construe that term very narrowly. A more 
expansive term that would capture all types of payments made to third 
parties would better serve the goal of ending third party payments. 
Additionally, the law does not make it clear that organizations could not 
receive the payments: it prohibits a donation to any person. It would be 
prudent for Congress to explicitly clarify that organizations such as non-
profits cannot receive payments.208 
Similarly, the Agency Accountability Act does not go far 
enough.209 While the proposed law would apply to the DOJ, it runs into 
the same problem as the Miscellaneous Receipts Act: it uses the term 
receives. The DOJ has indicated that the consumer relief provisions are 
never actually received by the DOJ, and no proceeds of the consumer 
relief provisions pass through the hands of a government official. If the 
proposed law is intended to apply to consumer relief provisions, it must 
                                                          
205 See generally “Consumers Shortchanged? Oversight of the Just. Dep’t’s 
Mortgage Lending Settlements” Before the Judiciary Subcomm. on Regulatory 
Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law, 114th Cong.  (2015) (testimony of Alan 
M. White). 
206 See Figley, supra note 66.  
207 Id. 
208 While the Supreme Court has made it clear for the purpose of free speech that 
an organization is a legal person, it is not certain that this interpretation would 
apply. See generally Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
209 See Agency Accountability Act, supra note 77. 
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define receives in such a way as to make no mistake as to the intent of 
Congress. 
C. Congress Should Prohibit Third Party Payments 
The Heritage Foundation’s Paul Larkin, Jr. proposed that 
Congress could eliminate third-party settlement payments by requiring 
that all funds paid in any type of civil or criminal settlement agreement 
be deposited into the Treasury.210 Rather than agencies acting as quasi-
appropriators, settlement funds would be returned to the Treasury to be 
used for other purposes and disbursed as part of the ordinary 
appropriations process.211  
To implement this solution, Congress could add to each federal 
agency’s enabling statute a prohibition against settlement agreements 
that include a payment by a defendant to a third party unharmed by the 
actions of the defendant. Under such a prohibition, an agency such as the 
SEC or the CFPB would not be able to enter into an agreement, on its 
own or in conjunction with the DOJ or another agency or State, that 
required, authorized, or incentivized the defendant to donate money to a 
third party not directly harmed by the defendant. Judges would be 
prohibited from approving an agreement with a third-party payment 
unless a statute explicitly authorized the payment. This prohibition 
should not extend to restitution for actual victims or any other payment 
authorized by law under the statute such as payments to 
whistleblowers.212  
This reform would require agencies to refrain from signing on to 
agreements that include prohibited payments. However, the DOJ or a 
state’s Attorney General might still be able to enter agreements that 
include third-party payments while the federal agency enters into its 
own, separate agreement including statutory penalties. For example, in 
the Bank of America action, the SEC entered into a separate agreement, 
which was attached as Exhibit B to the DOJ settlement,213 and the bank 
must pay the SEC’s portion of the settlement ($135.8 million) to the 
DOJ. To be effective, a legislative prohibition would have to apply to 
                                                          
210 See Larkin, supra note 71. 
211 Id. 
212 See WHISTLEBLOWER INFORMANT AWARD, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 
(2017).   
213 See In the Matter of Bank of Am. Corp., Respondent., Release No. 72888, at 
*11 (Aug. 21, 2014), https://perma.cc/MU6F-HH6P. 
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any written agreement to which a federal agency is party or in which it is 
otherwise involved.  
Congress could also enact another more specific reform along 
the lines of the Larkin proposal: write into criminal and civil liability 
statutes prohibitions on settling violations of the law with third-party 
payment agreements. For example, Congress could write a provision into 
statutes, such as FIRREA and the False Claims Act, which would 
prevent the settlement of claims under those statutes if the settlement 
requires, authorizes, or incentivizes a payment to a third party. Congress 
could also legislatively limit how settlement payments can be made in 
settlement of common law claims brought by the United States. 
Such a prohibition would not preclude restitution to victims 
directly harmed by the defendant’s conduct under the relevant law.214 
Statutorily-authorized legal remedies such as restitution, remediation, 
disgorgement, forfeiture, fines, and penalties should continue to be legal 
where specifically authorized by Congress. 
Congress would not overstep its bounds by providing direction 
to the DOJ and other agencies on how to craft settlements. Even though 
the Attorney General has broad settlement power, the DOJ has 
acknowledged that he must exercise discretion based on the specific 
statutory limits that Congress has provided.215 Congressional guidelines 
would help the DOJ and other agencies to focus their settlement efforts 
and would make settlements more transparent and easier to compare with 
one another.  
VIII. CONCLUSION 
To reclaim its appropriations and law-writing powers, Congress 
should prohibit federal agencies and the DOJ from entering settlement 
agreements that require or allow payments to non-whistleblower third 
parties who were not directly harmed by the conduct at issue. The use of 
the federal government’s enforcement powers to distribute money to 
third parties is de facto appropriations activity. Just as the current DOJ 
has used these bank settlements to secure funds for non-profits that some 
may consider politically left, another administration could require that 
settlement funds be directed to conservative causes and organizations.216  
                                                          
214 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, The Restitution Process for Victims of Fed. Crimes, 
https://perma.cc/PVV3-RCM8. 
215 See Peterson, supra note 122, at 347. 
216 See Epstein, supra note 69. 
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Our system of constitutionally transparent and accountable 
government will erode over time and the rule of law will be diminished if 
the Executive Branch continues to encroach on Congress’s constitutional 
powers by diverting money from the Treasury to causes favored by the 
Executive Branch. As scholars and policymakers continue to reexamine 
the accumulation of power in the Executive Branch at the expense of 
Congress, they should consider the power with which the DOJ currently 
induces settlement. Using settlements to distribute a defendant’s money 
to uninjured, unrelated parties is a misuse of the legal system and an 
affront to the Constitutional separation of powers. 
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